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Ambassador's Note:
SDGs and Tanzania Development Vision 2050

By

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SDGs, or the Sustainable Development Goals, are a set of 17 universal goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015 as part of the agenda for Sustainable Development. They provide a global blueprint to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure peace and prosperity for all by 2030, emphasising the interconnectedness of economic growth, social wellbeing, and environmental protection.

The report of SDGs 2024, suggests that with just six years remaining, current progress falls far short of what is required to meet the SDGs. It is an undeniable fact that without massive investment and scaled up action, the achievement of the SDGs, the blueprint for a more resilient and prosperous world and the roadmap out of current global crises will remain elusive. So far, the remaining impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, escalating conflicts, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, Africa, Western and Eastern Europe, failing multilateralism as well as growing climate challenge have severely hindered progress. The report details the urgent priorities and areas that need stronger and more effective action to keep the 2030 promise to end poverty, protect the planet and leave no one behind. From the report, developing countries particularly least developing countries and lower middle-income ones have made some progress despite the challenges experienced in implementing the SDGs. It remains to be seen if these worrying trends will continue to challenge the resolve of the international community to complete the SDGs agenda.

Focusing on Tanzania, the country has made significant strides in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as part of its broader vision 2050, which is aiming at inclusive development for Tanzanians. The implementation of the SDGs in Tanzania encompasses various areas, including poverty reduction, gender equality and environmental sustainability among others. Data obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics indicates that there have been notable achievements in the creation of the necessary policy frameworks correctly aligned

with the SDGs, linking them directly to national development plans, including the second National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA II) and the Tanzania Development Vision.

Analysis of available information shows that in terms of Institutional arrangements, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania has set up coordination mechanisms for SDGs related activities. In order to ensure effective implementation of the SDGs, a dedicated unit within the Prime Minister's Office was established to oversee and monitor the planned SDGs activities. Furthermore, efforts have been made by the National Bureau of Statistics to improve data collection and monitoring systems to track progress on the SDGs.

The Government of Tanzania has established consistency in ensuring community involvement in Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now SDGs. Consequently, like the notable achievements in MDGs, there is a growing awareness and participation at the community level to achieve the SDGs. In this process, local government and civil society organisations have been engaged in promoting sustainable development practices.

In terms of funding the SDGs, cooperating partners and the government have been key contributors. Nevertheless, there have been Public Private Partnership collaborations between the government and private sector as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Of interest is their common resolve to provide funding for facilitating and supporting various SDGs initiatives particularly in health, education and infrastructure. There have been challenges along the way in implementing SDGs of which some are resource constraints like limited financial and technical resources hampering full realisation of the goals. There are also significant infrastructural deficits particularly in rural areas, affecting access to essential services. Environmental challenges have also compromised success in the implementation. These include the impact of climate change, droughts, deforestation, and difficulties in natural resource management. These remain critical issues impacting sustainable development.

Moving forward to future development policy management, the implementation of the SDGs in Tanzania is intricately linked to the country's path to achieving Vision 2050. By integrating sustainability into its development agenda, enhancing institutional capacity, fostering community participation, and mobilising resources, Tanzania can create a prosperous, equitable, and sustainable future for its citizens. In conclusion, the recently adopted Tanzania National Vision 2050 is clearly building on the capacity for government and local institutions to ensure effective

implementation and monitoring of both SDGs and the goals set out in Vision 2050. Certainly, leveraging domestic and international financial resources is essential to fund development projects. In addition, investing in education and health is critical for fostering a skilled workforce, which can drive industrial growth and innovation, aligned with Vision 2050's objectives of economic advancement, combating climate change and promote sustainable natural resource management which are crucial to protecting Tanzania's biodiversity and ensuring sustainable livelihoods which are key to both the SDGs and Vision 2050.

Role of Local Politics in the Localization and Implementation of International Agreements: A Case of SDG4 in Tanzania

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Abstract

Once states participate in international agreements, the agreements become policy decisions. These decisions are then translated into local policies for the aim of implementation. Consequently, taking into account the influence of local politics, these foreign policy decisions are found to be facing two kinds of politics. The first type of politics being that of decision making at the international agreement level while the second is that of local politics of policy formulation and implementation. Using theoretical and empirical secondary data as well as data from political party manifestos for the 2015 general elections in Tanzania, this article sought to assess the extent to which the implementation of SDG 4 in Tanzania was affected by local politics. Findings show that the implementation of SDG4 through the introduction of free basic education in Tanzania was seriously affected by party politics and central planning mode of policy making. The ownership of the overall process of implementation of this international agreement remained in the hands of a few elites while the local implementors remained constrained in terms of both financial resources and power to interpret the objectives of the locally designed Free Free Basic Education Program (FBEP). The paper proposes an inclusive, expert - led local policy formulation and implementation process guided by a coherent education policy framework.

Key terms:

Free Basic Education, local politics, policy implementation, Sustainable Development Goals.

1. Introduction

When states consent to international agreements, the agreements become choices that may be regarded as decisions that the states have made as part of their foreign policies. How these decisions are made has become an issue of theoretical contentions. Among the major theoretical perspectives discussing how such decisions are made are rationalism and behaviourism. Actually, the introduction of

behaviourism as a new perspective on the analysis of foreign policy significantly challenged the dominance of realist rationalism on how foreign policy decisions are made and the role of multiple actors in foreign policy decision making. Instead of focusing basically of foreign policy *outcomes*, behaviourists put emphasis on the need to understand the *process* of foreign policy decision making. This debate led to the birth of heated discussions on the roles of structure and agency in foreign policy decision making (Alden and Aran, 2017). While rationalism presents the state as a unitary actor in foreign policy decision making, behaviourists present foreign policy decision making as a complex process influenced by the presence of several actors and factors interacting in two types of environments: internal and external. The internal environment is made up of a complex web of local within-the-state actors that influence foreign policy decisions. These actors include various interest groups and, particularly, political parties (Jones, 1979).

Notwithstanding the existence of robust behaviouralist literature on foreign policy choices and how foreign policy decisions are made, there is one aspect of the process of foreign policy analysis that has received an unfairly little attention. This is the aspect of policy decisions implementation¹. It has therefore been argued that, to be successful, the implementation of the SDGs must imperatively pay attention to interlinkages across societal actors like local authorities, government agencies, private sector, and civil society (Jaiyesimi, 2016). An important aspect of this interlinkage is the aspect of the nature of the local political environment which determines how implementation decisions are made and executed.

Hence, while literature on the analysis of foreign policy makes a fundamental claim to explaining the conduct of inter-state actions through a deep analysis of the decision-making process, its scholars devote very little energy to assessing how these decisions are actually localized, operationalised and executed and the implications of their success or failure. It is important therefore to note that, foreign policy is a derivative of a state's interpretation of stimuli from the external environment and, concurrently, responds to feedback based on the local implementation of these very same policies. This argument emanates from the awareness that foreign policy decision-making theory is predicated on a systems approach which assumes that there is a feedback loop of information from the

¹ It is noteworthy that as early as 1985 foreign policy implementation was already a concern of policy analysts (Smith and Clarke, 1985).

implementation environment to policy makers, allowing for readjustment and innovation (Alden and Aran, 2017). As these authors have argued:

Agents on the ground, their parochial interpretation of national foreign policy directives, and the form these take when translated into local actions is a feature of the feedback loop that arguably is as consequential a part of the decision making as the original formulation (p. 150).

Essentially, this article banks of the argument by Clarke and Smith (1985) who emphasized the nature of actual *control over implementation* as a key foreign policy influence that determines its uneven trajectory from policy goals and formulation to policy application and any subsequent adjustment. In this article, the foreign policy decision maker is faced with two types of politics of decision making. The first category is that of pluralist politics of foreign policy choices as proposed under the behavioural perspective. The second is concerned with plural politics of decision making at the level of localization and implementation of foreign policy choices. The second category of decision-making politics happens when states are to decide the kinds of local policies to formulate for the implementation of foreign policy choices. This includes how the local policies are formulated and how they are implemented.

In 2015 the United Nations adopted 17 goals as part of Agenda 2030. One of the important areas of focus for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is access to quality education for every child. Specifically, among the SDGs, goal number four is about ensuring inclusive and equitable education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. The focus of this article is on the implementation of SDG number four in Tanzania localized and implemented through Fee Free Basic Education Program (FBEP) starting in 2016.

Although there was a new emphasis in 2015 when equality of access to basic education became a major component of the election manifestos of the two major political parties in Tanzania, it is noteworthy that the declared aim of ensuring equality of access to basic education has been the ambition of Tanzanian education policymakers for many years. The historical periodization of education policymaking in Tanzania falls under four major milestones. The first is education for manpower planning and modernization (independence to 1967), the second is education for self-reliance (1968 – 1974), the third is education for socialism (1974 – 1980) and the last is education for survival (1980 -1986). Several other authors have used the same approach of historical periodization of education policy-making in Tanzania. Examples include Carr–Hill (1984), Galabawa (1990), Mushi (2009) and Schmitz (2010).

Table 1: Periodization of education policy evolution in Tanzania

| Samoff (1994) | | | | Schmitz (2010) | FBEP |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|--|
| Education for manpower planning and modernization (Independence-1967) | Education for self-reliance (1968-1974) | Education for socialism (1974-1980) | Education for survival (1980-1986) | Education for Liberalization (1982-1999) to be extended to 2014 | Fee – Free Basic Education Program (2016 -) |

Source: Adapted and improved from Samoff (1994) and Schmitz (2010).

One important qualifying element of the periodization of education policymaking in Tanzania is the fact that the intention to equalize access to education has persisted across policy changes and has permeated the demarcations of the periods. Equality of access has been a major theme in educational planning in Tanzania since 1962 (Mbilinyi, 1976). The second is that agenda-setting for education policy in Tanzania has historically been predominantly influenced by the ruling party, TANU, and later CCM, central committees (McHenry, 1994). So, the SDG4 agenda found a historical background of high-level political will to provide equal access to basic education to all Tanzanian children inspired by the spirit of socialism.

In an attempt to implement SDG number 4, in 2014 the government of Tanzania introduced its revised education policy declaring its intention to provide fee-free basic education. The policy extended the terrain of fee-free education to include secondary education whereas primary education had been declared fee-free since the introduction of Primary Education Development Program (PEDP) in 2002. In 2015 the government issued a circular which directed the immediate implementation of fee-free secondary education to ensure equal access to quality basic education for all Tanzanian children. UNICEF (2000) defines quality education in terms of healthy, well-nourished learners, safe and well-managed classes and the learning environment in general, relevant curricula, well-trained teachers, and outcomes that are linked to national goals for education and positive participation in society.

2. Background to Politics and Policy Implementation

2.1. Elitist Politics and Performance of Public Policies

Politics can have very significant effects on the implementation of public policy. Taylor, Zarb, & Jeschke, (2021) provide the following four propositions about the

likelihood of negative results of implementing policy/programs under the influence of politics. The first is that public policies are less likely to be implemented successfully when the credibility of the actors who formulated the policy is low in the eyes of street level bureaucrats. The second proposition is that policies are less likely to be implemented successfully when they are part of a package of policy programs (like part of election agenda) which do not include street level bureaucrats in the formulation process. The third proposition is that policies are more likely to be implemented successfully when policymakers send clear messages about the goals of the policy. Unclear or confusing policy objectives or actions may be one reason why some policies are not implemented successfully (Calista 1994, p.32). Finally, policies are less likely to be implemented successfully when policy implementers are unable to interpret the goals of a policy. Implementers at the local level must be endowed with autonomy and resources to make boundedly rational decisions that meaningfully translate policy goals into actions. These four propositions are used to assess the nature of the political context surrounding the implementation of SDG4 in Tanzania.

Other literature has also shown a strong correlation between elitist politics and public policy implementation. Hyden (1975), for example, highlights the following indicators of an elitist centrally planned public policy which are in contrast to rational policy making. The first is the urge to do everything and do it at once resulting in a tendency to load the implementation agencies with a whole set of divergent and often contradictory goals hence causing strain on the execution process. The second is that motivation outruns understanding in which case policy-makers make decisions focusing only on the desired outcomes and not on the process. They don't pose to first obtain full and detailed knowledge of the possible consequences of these decisions. The third indicator is that policy-makers do not want to use the past as a source of guidance for the future because the past is considered an enemy to break away from. The final indicator is that public policies are made in such a way that public sector officers operate in a context in which policy expectations by top-level government authorities tend to exceed what can be achieved by the role incumbents. This fact creates a sense of insecurity among public servants.

Evidence for the possibility that politics can adversely affect the implementation of well-intended public policies is rampant. Literature claims that most public policies in Africa are elitist. One characteristic of elitist educational policies in Africa is that they are not only top down but also hurriedly formulated and implemented. Little (2010) has indicated that, in the case of Ghana, for example, the reforms that led to the formulation of the Education for All policy were announced by the secretary for

education and culture in October 1986 for implementation from September 1987 and the handling of the initial implementation was firm and decisive. Planning on how the policy was to be implemented happened during implementation. There was no piloting and the country wide implementation of the policy started only eleven months after the announcement. This approach had the aim of preventing vested interests from mobilizing against the reforms. The result is that there was tension between technical and political imperatives of education. The author indicates that 'Politically, reforms are often pushed through hard and fast to circumvent resistance and/or to secure electoral support. Pushed too fast the political imperative can backfire and create tensions in the early stages of implementation' (p.15). In Ghana, the implementors emphasized the need for trial and pilot projects before the policy is rolled out to large scale.

Another example that is given of an elitist education policy is the Nigeria's 'Free Education for All' policy. The Compulsory, Free, Universal Basic Education Act of 2004 introduced the "free education for all". Through this policy the government of Nigeria promised to finance books, instructional materials, classrooms and furniture. However, the policy is said to have failed to establish a strong system of public education. The public lost confidence in public schools and opted for private education regardless of the high financial cost of this alternative. This is said to be an indication of the failure of the government and its agents to implement the policy due to its comprehensiveness (Makinde, 2005). Another evaluator has associated the failure of the policy to unrealistic cost analyses because the cost of education includes not only tuition fees, classes and books but other indirect costs like uniforms, exercise books, transport, other school levies as well as supplementary lessons (Olalekan, 2018).

Another case is Uganda. By 1997, only 20% of children were going to secondary school in Uganda. The introduction of free universal primary education in 1997 led to an increase of 136% to the rate of primary school leavers who went to secondary school in Uganda between 1997 and 2006. The country introduced a universal free secondary school education in 2007. The government paid for tuition while the parents and guardians shouldered the rest of educational costs. The aim of the Universal Secondary Education (USE) policy was to increase access to secondary school and improve the quality of secondary education. The policy came as part of Yoweri Museveni's re-election promises during the 2006 general elections in Uganda. Nevertheless, the policy had its background in some international conventions like Education for All and the Sustainable Development Goals. At least

in the case of Uganda, the policy was implemented after a year's piloting (Werner, 2011).

The policy led to a very high increase in enrolment (Jacob & Lehner, 2011) but the quality of educational performance declined. This is partly explained by the fact that the policy was primarily rolled out to play a political role. Improvement in educational service quality was a secondary aim. Classrooms became congested, there were no enough books no enough teachers, and compensation for teachers diminished, among other problems. The quality of education was never improved because, although the policy was designed with co-responsibility of parents, schools and government in mind, its implementation was without sufficient attention to the real context of the schools (Huylebroeck and Kristof, 2015).

In Kenya, there had been several attempts to introduce free secondary education but the aim was adversely affected by politics of aspiration. Kessio (2020) showed that election manifestos had been used in Kenya to show political responsibility and commitment since 1963 when KANU published a manifesto committing the subsequent government to offering seven years of free primary education. This commitment was reiterated and improved in the 1969 general elections in Kenya when KANU pledged to extend educational services to areas neglected during colonialism. In addition, a presidential decree that was issued in Kenya in 1971 abolished educational fees for districts geographically disadvantaged. Finally, in 2002 the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) included the promise to offer fee-free education as part of its election manifesto. When it was finally introduced, the program was a merely a response to political promises made during the 2007 general election. The implementation proved to be highly ineffective. The cost of implementing the program was far higher than the government could support. Classes became overcrowded, teachers were only replaced and not recruited as the number of students increased, which led to the emergency of untrained teachers. In general, government funding could not cover everything (Otieno & Colclough, 2009).

Although literature from Tanzania has not clearly linked the implementation of the FBEP to party politics, there evidence that politics adversely affect public policy in Tanzania. Kawishe and Mallya (2022), for example, argue that politics adversely affect the implementation of public policies in Tanzania and insist that the political dimension of (public) policy implementation needs to be systematically examined because politics is a variable that matters and can steer public policy implementation. Actually, the implementation of the FBEP faces a prevalence of teachers with low qualifications, a shortage of teaching and learning resources, the

problem of children living in vulnerable environments, and the prevalence of high dropout rates. There is a dilemma between educational stakeholders on policy statements such as fee-free education and the smooth implementation of these statements to create a common understanding (Ndibalema, 2019). The author continues to argue that statistics 'about the provision of basic education in Tanzania raise several concerns about quality and sustainability of fee-free basic education strategies' (p. 34). This collection of literature is evidence that local politics is a crucial factor for the success or failure of a public policy.

2.2. Theoretical underpinning

Formulation of local public policies is a fundamental initial step in the localization of international agreements. Public policy is the broad framework of ideas and values within which decisions are taken and actions, or inaction, are pursued by governments about some issue or problem (Brooks, 1989). Although public policies are said to be made through a process involving citizens, government officials, and elected officials who, ideally, work together to set an agenda for a social common good (Dodd and Boyd, 2000), elitism mostly dominates public policy-making. This article is therefore guided by the Elitist Theory of public policy making. Elitism means that, in every society there is a group of people (government officials and politicians) with power to make, influence, and execute policy. These powerful people sometimes work through political parties or other forms of interest groups.

Elite Theory of Public Policy proposes that the population in every human society is divided into two major groups. One is the ruled masses and the second is the group of the rulers or elites. Elite theory of public policy views public policy as the outcome of preferences and values of a few people who govern the society. The elite have the power and resources to influence and shape the opinion of the masses on policy questions. The masses are receivers of these policies. They are apathetic in most cases unable to influence the opinion and preferences of the elite. According to elite theory, public policy does not flow upward from the demands of the people but downward from the interests, values and preferences of the elites (Mosca 1939). Under Elite Theory, public officials (the bureaucrats) merely carry out the policies as decided on by the top government level policy makers (the elites). Because of the relative smallness of their group, the elites can more easily, than the masses, resolve any inherent disagreements and reach policy consensus. As a result, policy decisions are seldom made by the masses through elections or through political party representation. Under Elite theory these institutions are mainly symbolic when it comes to the formulation of public policy. Nevertheless, Elitism does not imply that the policies made will be hostile to the welfare of the masses; it only implies that

the responsibility for mass welfare rests on the shoulders of the elites and not the masses (Dye, 2008). Elite Theory, therefore, focuses on the role of political leaders in the making and implementation of public policy (Kraft and Furlong, 2007).

In Tanzania, public policymaking has, for a long time, been equated to planning. In such cases, a sovereign political body exists which defines and specifies social and economic objectives for the policies. This sovereign body works with subordinated groups of planners, who are directly responsible for the formulation of the plan. Given its relative position in the international race for development, Tanzania adopted the slogan developed by her first president Julius Nyerere 'We Must Run While Others Walk'. This notion has informed public policymaking in Tanzania for many years – starting with the era of Ujamaa (Hyden, 1975). This style of policy planning and implementation required close political supervision at every stage of the policy cycle. As a result, politics has dominated the whole process of public policy making in Tanzania from policy formulation through policy goal communication to policy implementation (Hyden, 2008).

Literature on public policymaking in Tanzania during the early years of Ujamaa shows that the ruling political party's central committee played a very significant role in this process (McHenry, 1994). Specifically, Hartman (1983) describes in detail the predominant role of the president (in this case Julius Nyerere) and party activists in originating important policy ideas and setting and promoting national policy agenda. Recent literature indicates that the centralized planning mode of public policy-making in Tanzania is still persistent. It is noteworthy that the process of policymaking in Tanzania is still very much influenced by party politics and that the role of the president in policymaking is still one of domination of the policy process through commands, orders, and directives. Although public policy ideas may emanate from individuals or other interest groups, in essence, the actual policy problems are centrally identified and prioritized (Marijani and Hussein, 2022).

Aden and Aran (2017) have argued that the problems of foreign policy implementation are constituted first by 'slippage', that is to say the gap between policy maker's intentions in promulgating a particular policy and the manner in which the foreign policy bureaucracy actually operationalise it. To attest to the fact that policy implementation in Tanzania is also, clearly, highly influenced by politics, some writers have indicated that policy implementation in Tanzania is dominated by practices of patronage and that 'the effect of patronage on policy implementation is slippage, which means poor implementation of policy whereby, for example, funds do not reach intended constituencies or are just delayed because officials allocate

resources, not on the strength of strict rules but according to personal services rendered' (Hyden and Mmuya, 1996, p. 85). Hyden (2008) argues strongly that, in an African setting, 'variation in outcome and effectiveness is very much the result of how strategic actors apply power' (p. 12). The author shows that both policy formulation and policy implementation are at the mercy of power politics and builds a strong case for causal relationship between power politics and public policy outcomes.

3. Methodological approach

This study used a qualitative approach and collected and thematically analysed qualitative secondary data to respond to the question 'to what extent is the process of implementing SDG4 in Tanzania affected by local politics?' As an explanatory study, this work focused on how the implementation of international agreements can be affected by local political context citing the case of SDG4 in Tanzania and setting local party politics as the independent variable determining the success or failure of this implementation. The study therefore reviewed two kinds of qualitative documents. The first category of literature included party manifestos and government circulars/directives. The inclusion criterion was that the literature should belong to any of the two major political parties during the 2015 general elections in Tanzania. This category was used to analyse the role of party politics in the formulation, communication and implementation of SDG4 in Tanzania.

The second category included literature that focused on describing the nature of the local political context faced by the implementors of SDG4 in Tanzania. The inclusion criterion accepted literature that mainly discussed the Tanzanian political context soon after the general elections of 2015. This literature was used to validate the hypothesis that politics affected the performance of street level bureaucrats who implemented SDG4 in Tanzania through the operationalization of the Free Basic Education Program.

4. Findings and Discussion

4.1. Politics of Localization and Contextualization of SDG4 in Tanzania

As already hinted, the first step in the implementation of international agreements is localization through formulation of public policies/programs. In the case of the FBEP, the localization of the SDG4 started with including it as a major election agenda. In a section titled *Quality Education for all Tanzanians*, CHADEMA's Election Manifesto for 2015 acknowledges the strategic importance of education for the development of the Tanzanian society. The section begins by noting that

knowledgeable people are a crucial factor in the construction of a solid economic base and ensuring sustainable growth. It also points out that for more than fifty years Tanzania's education system failed to produce the necessary manpower for the achievement of these objectives. The section mentions some of the challenges facing the education sector as the low standard of the learning environment, and inadequate supply of teachers and equipment. The manifesto indicates that:

There are neither laboratories nor laboratory equipment and technicians; there are neither libraries nor books; there are not enough qualified teachers. The quality of education is too poor to prepare the youth for employment or self-employment (p.18).

In this manifesto, CHADEMA argued that there was (in 2015) a big difference in the quality of the education offered according to social classes. This difference is seen in teaching, types of books, qualification of teachers, education infrastructure, and teaching equipment. Therefore, the party promised 'to offer quality education wholly financed by government from kindergarten to university for every Tanzanian so that no Tanzanian shall be left behind' (p.20). In terms of quality also, the promise was to oversee the quality of education all over the country. This includes improving students' health by expanding nutrition programs in schools as a way of improving attendance and curbing the problem of truancy. Finally, CHADEMA in 2015 also promised to improve teachers' welfare and their necessary work equipment which includes accommodation, transport, and technological equipment (p.20). The expected outcome was stated on page 21 of the manifesto as *Quality education that enables graduates at each level of education to be self-reliant and able to effectively contribute to the development of their country and community.*

These findings show that CHADEMA political elites were using the provisions and demands of *SDG4* to strengthen their party manifesto in order to win the general elections of 2015. They used the notable short comings in the education policy in Tanzania to make a promise to improve the situation once elected. The process of how the data was collected and how the free education agenda was feasible in Tanzania at that time was unclear. No feasibility studies were presented to authenticate the promise of free basic education given the available resources in the country.

On its side, CCM in 2015 promised to focus on modern education with special attention to Science and Technology, to build the foundation for a modern economy and an independent self-reliant nation. In recognition of this reality, CCM's 2015 election manifesto gives special priority to the development of the education sector. In the period of five years from 2015 to 2020 CCM promised to 'make sure that the

government oversees the implementation of the Education and Training Policy of 2001' (p.91) which had specifically been reviewed to accommodate the SDG4. Among the stated plans for the achievement of the education sector development objectives of CCM are the following:

- a) To prepare and introduce a fee-free upscaling spiral kindergarten and basic education system to ensure that (among other things) the admission of the target age group into lower secondary education grows from 60 percent in 2015 to 80 percent in 2020.
- b) To prepare and implement a system of acquiring and distributing textbooks and other books for all levels of education by making sure that 50 percent of capitation funds for running schools is used in the publication and distribution of books (p.97).
- c) CCM committed to continuing with the implementation of the Education and Vocational Training Policy of 2014 which made education compulsory and free (p.97)
- d) To review and update educational guidelines to remove barriers that make students fail to complete their basic education. The commitment was to ensure that dropout rates in the basic education system fall from 8.2 percent in 2015 to only 2 percent in 2020 and that all girls dropping from the basic education system due to pregnancies go back to school (p.98).

The translation of the aim to provide fee-free basic education in Tanzania from an election agenda to a practical policy spearheaded by the president himself is a demonstration of the high level of political will. This political will was officially communicated through *Waraka wa Elimu Namba 3 wa Mwaka 2016 Kuhusu Utekelezaji wa Elimu msingi Bila Malipo* (Referred in this paper as: Education Circular number 3 of 2016). This circular is the main guideline for the implementation of the FBEP. In its introduction part, the Education Circular number 3 of 2016 mentions that the intention of the government to offer fee-free basic education from kindergarten to lower secondary was communicated through another Education Circular number 4 of 2014. The Education Circular number 3 of 2016 is therefore a guideline for the implementation of this intention. This circular has three sections and 12 subsections detailing the duties of each stakeholder from the government to the parent.

Section 2.0 of the circular explains the meaning of Fee Free Basic Education as the provision of basic education where a child (pupil or student) will learn without the parent or guardian having to pay tuition fees or any other financial contributions that were being paid before the release of Education Circular number 5 of 2015. The government commits to covering tuition fees for all students in public secondary schools. The various financial obligations for parents/guardians had been communicated through various government circulars and are summarized in section 2, subsection i – v as follows:

Table 2: Parents/guardians Educational Financial Obligation Before the FBEP

| s/n | Financial Obligation | Circular |
|-----|--|--------------------------------------|
| 1. | Secondary School tuition fees amount to TZS 40,000 for day scholars and TZS 70,000 for boarding. | Education circular number 9 of 1998 |
| 2. | Reduce day scholar fees from TZS 40,000 to TZS 20,000 | Education circular number 11 of 2004 |
| 3. | Various contributions agreed upon through school committees | Education circular number 8 of 2011 |
| 4. | Examinations fees (re-introduced) | Education circular number 1 of 2012 |
| 5. | TZS 1,000 per student compulsory contribution for school inspection (non-public schools) | Education circular number 1 of 2013 |

Source: Compiled from URT (2016)

N.B: Except for Education Circular number 1 of 2013, the introduction of Education Circular number 3 of 2016 repeals and replaces all these other circulars.

Section 3.1 of this circular gives the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) the mandate to oversee the implementation of the FBEP through issuing guidelines as well as monitoring and evaluation. Section 3.2 of Education circular number 3 of 2016 gives the roles of coordination, planning, and budgeting for the implementation of the FBEP to the President's Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG). Subsection 3.2(i) states that the PO-RALG shall set aside capitation funds for the running of secondary schools where 50% of the funds will be for the purchase of text books. Actual annual budgeting and disbursement of funds is the mandate of the Directors at district, town, municipal or city councils. Subsection 3.5(v) requires the Directors to set aside capitation fees for the running of schools whereby 60% for primary schools and 50% for secondary schools will be particularly for the purchase of teaching and learning materials for special education students. Also, to set aside and send to respective schools, funds

for the purchase of furniture including desks, equipment for sports and games, repairs and maintenance of all school infrastructure.

The office of the Regional Commissioner (RC) is given the power and mandate in section 3.3(ii) to receive, deliberate upon requests and issue permits to allow schools to solicit contributions from parents/guardians for the provision of meals (lunch for day scholars) and meals and other services for boarding students. School Boards/committees are required to coordinate all voluntary contributions and seek permit from the office of the RC through the office of the concerned district council (subsection 3.7(iii)). Subsection 3.5(vi) requires the councils to set aside funds for meals for all special needs students in public schools (both day scholars and boarders) as well as travel fare during vacation. Subsection 3.7(viii) provides that the school committees have the duty to set aside and provide funds for the upkeep of all students in vulnerable environments including orphans according to various government guidelines.

Although the details above may show commitment of CCM to providing free education in the country, the process of agenda setting was also like that of CHADEMA. Both parties used the promise of free education to strengthen their manifestos in order to win the 2015 general elections. Scientific rational procedures necessary for the setting of public policy agenda were pushed aside to give way to the urgency of winning the election. As there was no clear national education policy framework, the formulation of the FBEP mainly followed the same culture of central planning that existed in the country.

4.2. Politics of Implementation of SDG4 in Tanzania

As indicated in the methodology section, literature for this section included a description of the political context within which the FBEP was formulated and implemented. As an elitist program, the FBEP was formulated under a notable serious effect of power politics. Public officers during the period of the formulation of the FBEP worked in an environment of role insecurity. The president used the approach described by Hyden (1975) to enforce performance through the creation of insecurity of tenure. This approach is well captured in Shivji (2021). This proves that the FBEP was a top-down elitist education program whose chances of successful implementation would be expected to be low according to Taylor, Zarb, and Jeschke, (2021). This model has been criticized for being in conflict with the actual environment of policy execution hence creating policy environmental uncertainty. Planning is done without adherence to scientific facts and under comprehensive uncertainty. This lack of science in policy formulation and

implementation is a potential recipe for policy failure. For example, Leys (1969) argues that the relative failure of Tanzania's first Five-Year Development Plan (1964-1969) was caused by lack of specific and concrete political goals. Its objectives were ambiguous and not based on analysis of empirical facts.

The negative effects of politics in both policy formulation and execution are identifiable in the case of the FBEP. The role of the president in national policymaking was exemplified in the formulation and the rolling out of the FBEP. Shivji (2021) argues that 'he (President Magufuli) was the first president who made meaningful and far-reaching decisions like abolishing primary and secondary school fees, ordering the building of classrooms and buying of desks... (p.5). This argument agrees with the propositions of the Elite Theory that policies are made by only the top class in the society. It equally agrees with Hyden (1975) and Hartman (1988) who showed the centrality and significance of the role of the president in national policymaking. The making of the FBEP as an education program followed a top-down approach based on the decisions and orders from top politicians particularly the president himself. It could rightly be argued that the FBEP was a policy formulated by political party elites, communicated and supervised closely by the president and implemented by street bureaucrats with no resource autonomy in an environment of political uncertainty and ambiguity.

This argument is founded on the fact that at the stage of policy execution, elitist policies are also dominated by politics. At this stage politics play a crucial role also in shaping policy outcomes by negatively affecting the process of policy execution/implementation. This role affects the likelihood that a policy or program will be implemented effectively and reach its stated goals. The effect of politics during the implementation of a public policy leads to policy ambiguity. At the implementation stage of any policy or program, ambiguity arises when the implementers find it difficult to interpret the policy and translate its content into desired outcomes. Yet, ambiguity starts at the stage of policy formulation. It is the idea that the policy problem itself was not interpreted the same way by different policymakers and therefore the policy goals and objectives communicated to policy implementers were unclear (Taylor, Zarb, & Jeschke, 2021).

This lack of clarity, as noted earlier, is in terms of both verbal content and resources content of the policy or program. The implementation of the FBEP was not exception. The political environment within which it was implemented did not give interpretive autonomy to the implementors. The implementors worked with several, sometimes contradicting directives. The environment was not well prepared for free basic education while the party manifesto had to be implemented

with urgency. One big problem was that of resources – just like it was the case with other African countries cited in this article. The implementation of the FBEP started without any assurance of resource endowment to fund the various aspects of costs for basic education. The findings support the argument of Ogu, (2013) who claimed that, at times, the only rationality that informs public policy-making is political pragmatism for winning elections.

These findings support the theoretical position that public policies/programs are less likely to be implemented successfully if they are a product of political deal-making, part of a policy package, ambiguously communicated and implemented in an environment of slippage. Supporting the argument by Clarke and Smith (1985) that actual *control over implementation* is a key foreign policy influence that determines its uneven trajectory from policy goal setting and policy formulation to policy application. In general, power remained with policymakers and not policy implementers, in the case of the FBEP. Politics dominated both the formulation and implementation of a well-intended public policy. It can therefore be argued that, elitism in public policy does not affect only local policies but that it affects even the implementation of international agreements like the SDGs.

5. Conclusion and recommendation

This paper has attempted to use available literature to draw an explanatory link between politics and the implementation of the SDG4 in Tanzania. The SDG4 was well received in Tanzania. It found a historical background of socialism which supported the notion of equal access to quality education for all children. It also met a high-level political will in Tanzania. Yet, the localization and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goal were seriously affected by local politics. The FBEP was not conceived through a rational process of policy decision-making. Politicians from both CHADEMA and CCM chose what would work for their parties during the time of elections without thorough involvement of education policy experts and the citizens at large. The FBEP fell victim to the long-standing tradition of national policymaking in which policies are made through central planning. Power for implementation seemed to be well dispersed but it was not effective. Slippage was still a notable shortcoming. This article has shown, therefore, that the implementation of SDGs may vary seriously from one country another due to effects of respective local politics.

It is recommended that the mode of policy making in Tanzania must be made more participatory and policy implementation less politicized. After policy goals have been formulated participatorily, and communicated to the implementers, the

autonomy for implementation must be enjoyed by the street level bureaucrats. Close supervision for accountability in the deployment and use of resources for the success of the FBEP is important but slippage must be reduced through power shifts from top level politicians to street level bureaucrats. This will also simplify goal interpretation and improve effectiveness in implementation. It is imperative to introduce a comprehensive national educational policy framework to guide educational policy formulation and communication and lay down standard indicators to guide the evaluation of educational policies in the country.

6. References

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Role of Community Policing in the Security of Small Businesses in Selected Localities of Dar Es Salaam

By

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Abstract

Community Policing is a people-centred security system for promoting involvement in combating and preventing crimes in their areas. The paper aimed at examining the role of community policing in the security of small businesses in selected localities of Dar es Salaam and how it has impact on the economic development of the localities. The study used qualitative research approach to collect primary data using interviews and focus group discussions. In addition, the study used secondary data obtained through documentary review. Findings reveal that community policing has promoted security of small businesses and hence improved business performance. In this way, community policing can be said to be among the major factors contributing to improvement in revenue collection and creation of entrepreneurship opportunities. Following these findings, it is recommended that, in spite of significant security changes in the studied localities, more needs to be done to enhance security of small businesses in Dar es Salaam. The study further recommends that stakeholders should put more efforts towards the inclusion and expansion of people – centred security mechanisms.

Key Words: *Community policing, Security, Small business.*

1. Introduction

At the end of the Second World War and formation of the United Nations, it was realized that many nations were spending more in the purchasing of arms than in sustainable socio – economic development. Sociologists and psychologists debated about the need for security sector reforms. It became widely believed that issues of security should be shifted to the people – centred from the arms centred philosophy. During the 1960s, the philosophy of Security Sector Reform (SSR) began to be

implemented. This implementation gained further momentum during 1990s especially when the of Cold War ended. The termination of Cold War allowed the world to observe countless Security Sector Reforms in many parts of the world. Members of western alliance, that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and eastern alliance (WARSAW PACT) shifted their attention from sponsoring wars and accumulation of weapons of mass destruction towards industrial development, technological advancement and economic transformation (Sedra, 2015).

A study by Krause, Jasutis, Vezon and Mikova (2025) reported that, it was the duty of each state to provide safety, security and justice to the people through traditional ways such as police, judiciary, courts and penitentiaries. The United Nations (UN) introduced Security Sector Reforms for the intentions of improving safety through increasing the effectiveness and accountability of security institutions controlled by civilians and operating according to human rights and the rule of law.

Security Sector Reforms in Africa have a long history since many of the nations inherited armies from their respective colonial master's in terms of structure and philosophy. In reforming the armies, the African nations were forced to form security organs which would protect and respect human rights. The African SSR is designed to respect the rule of law and human rights, ensure accountability, transparency and commitment to peace and security for the communities (Jones, 2017). SSR has become even more central to conflict prevention, social stabilization, peace building and development agendas across the continent and within communities (AU, 2014).

It is obvious that the police department cannot effectively deal with all crimes that happen in the communities due to factors such as rapid growth of suburb areas in towns and limited number of police personnel. In that case, they need people who share a common responsibility to resolve the communities' security problems (Kappeler, Gaines & Schaefer, 2020). Community Policing (CP) is a philosophy and strategy which involves community members to combat and prevent crime and improve the quality of life in the communities. The purpose of CP is to provide a better, responsive, responsible, efficient and effective police service. CP has been described by Sir Robert Peel's (United Kingdom prime minister, 1834 to 1835) as a democratic practice which seeks to realize the principle of "*police are the people, people are the police.*" CP requires the police to work together with the community in identifying, prioritizing, and dealing with crime, and ensuring safety, and order (Geo, 2021). In 1974, Chinese leader Mao Zedong asserted that, mass line policing"

(MLP) requires commitment “from the people, to the people.” MLP requires the police to listen to the people, and ascertain their problems, and empowers the people to participate in solving them. Community policing and mass line policing are similar phenomena which share the same trait of prevention and reduction of crime in communities (Wang, 2009).

Community policing is a collection of organizational strategies that allow police departments to decentralize services and promote the engagement of community members in security patrols. This partnership of the police with the communities focuses on resolving community problems. On the other hand, problem solving is where community policing officers (CPOs) attempt to deal with the conditions that cause crime and negatively affect the quality of life in a community. Problem solving is an important part of community policing (Innes, Roberts & Lowe, 2020).

Tanzania borders eight countries; six of them are landlocked. It is also a member of three regional trading partnerships with a combined marketplace of over 600 million people. Tanzania’s national five-year development plan 2021/22 - 2025/26 which promotes Competitive and Industrial Economy for Human Development can be achieved if there is sustainable security within the local communities. The government is promoting macroeconomic stability by supporting small and medium business expansion for job creation by provision of a secure environment for the expansion of trade (URT, 2021). Tanzania’s development plan reflects the Sustainable Development Goal 8 which requires the nations to create conducive environments for opportunities for everyone by having security in the workplace and social protection for families (UN, 2023).

Tanzania is one among other countries which implemented security sector reforms by introducing community policing to ensure security in the communities. The country benefited a lot from community policing which was officially started in 2006 by the former Inspector General of Police Mr. Said Mwema. The introduction of community policing has brought great changes and development in Tanzania by reducing crimes in the communities especially in the social and economic areas. It has also improved the lives of citizens, provided freedom and created safe environment for small businesses to operate. It has equally strengthened the relationship between communities and the police.

Community policing was introduced in Dar es Salaam, especially in the Kariakoo ward due to an increase in crimes in the streets while there were complaints that police officers were receiving bribes. The positive impact to Community policing is to reduce fear in the community. This helps to establish trust within the community,

improve quality of life of the community and reduce crimes. Eventually, CP has provided security to community activities particularly small business (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2014). Community Policing plays a vital role to the security of small business activities in the selected localities of Ilala, Kinondoni and Temeke municipalities in Dar es Salaam region.

Community policing has the responsibility of ensuring safety of the goods belonging to small entrepreneurs. It also involves reporting and prevention of crimes for the purposes of creating a good security environment for small business activities. The partnership between the police and community policing is to facilitate problem solving as well as engage communities in problem identification and consultative problem solving. Ilala, Kinondoni and Temeke municipalities have many activities of small and medium entrepreneurs. Tanzania Revenue Authority reported that the total revenue collected in the financial year 2022/2023 was TZS 23.658 trillion. A breakdown of these statistics shows that Dar es Salaam contributed 86.4% of the overall collection (Simtowe, 2024). In connection to that, in the same year (2022/2023) Kariakoo ward contributed TZS 40.8 billion. The revenue collected from Kariakoo ward surpasses the amount collected from other tax regions of Dar es Salaam (Pallangyo, 2023). The information above shows the significance of Kariakoo ward for economy of Dar es Salaam.

Tanzania lacks a formal retail shopping culture and it is estimated that up to 90% of food sales occur through traditional small stores, street vendors and unregulated markets. Since the 1990s there has been some growth in formal wholesale and retail of food in major towns and cities where supermarkets tend to serve largely expatriate and middle-class communities, often with a range of products imported from Kenya, Dubai, India and Europe. Wholesalers import goods in bulk from manufacturers or other wholesalers abroad, transport the goods to bonded warehouses, and later distribute them to retailers in the local market. Retailers purchase the goods, pay the required duties, and sell in small shops, usually specializing in one type of product. Some wholesalers, usually operators of supermarket chains and shopping malls, run both wholesale and retail operations.

Kariakoo Market Corporation (KMC), when it was formed in 1975, was given the task of managing the only legal wholesale market for fruit and vegetables in Dar es Salaam. The only legal controls or interventions in the marketing of fruit and vegetables are that, firstly, the wholesaling must be dealt with in Kariakoo by KMC-registered auctioneers. Secondly, that the suppliers delivering the product are

subject to a 6 per cent commission payable to KMC; and thirdly, the KMC advise maximum and minimum prices for each of the commodities.

In reality, however, there is limited monitoring and no regulation of the negotiated prices, and KMC is aware that their guide-lines are frequently exceeded. The KMC set the guide-lines on the basis of interviews of what they call 'price leaders'. However, the differing sizes, qualities, and varieties of the commodities and the different conditions under which individual prices are negotiated, make this kind of price estimation very difficult. Within the market the wholesalers are free to act, and KMC has no direct marketing involvement. As the managing organization, KMC provides market facilities in return for the commission charged (Pallangyo, 2023). Hence and increasingly most of trading in Kariakoo happens in the uncontrolled market.

In Tanzania, Dar es Salaam in particular, the question of informal entrepreneurship and small business, especially itinerant trading, was evident even during colonial period. Despite the obvious inefficacy of municipal policy, Dar es Salaam municipal officials viewed unlicensed street trading as either a public health threat and/or an activity which undermined the licensed and controlled trade conducted in the official markets. Nevertheless, the antipathy towards self-employment through these informal enterprises has diminished during the recent years. The small businesses are more and more regarded as entities worth of recognition and even protection against threats to security. The study set out to assess the influence of Community Policing on the development of small businesses in selected localities of Dar es Salaam region.

1. Theoretical underpinnings

This study was guided by theories of community policing propounded by Wang (2009) and Kappeler, Gainess and Schaefer (2012). These theories argue that community policing should follow the following components: *community partnerships and problem solving*. The first component is a partnership or enhanced relationship between the police and the community they serve. Through the partnership, the police are required to support people with a multitude of problems and social conditions including crime. In other words, the first element of the theory is a collaboration in which the police are indebted to provide support and active participation in dealing with community security problems. Wang (2009) advocated that, community policing as philosophy and plan should involve communities to combat crime and improve the quality of life within the communities. The involvement of Dar es Salaam residents in the prevention and combating of crimes within their communities is implementation of community policing. The ultimate purpose of CP is to provide a better (responsive and accountable, efficient and

effective) police service. The police must go beyond merely responding to crime and calls for service (Akpa, 2024). They must diagnose and treat the causes of these problems so that they are resolved. When problems are resolved, there is a higher level of politeness and calmness in a community (Kagoro, 2022).

It is obvious that community policing cannot remove all insecurity. However, it can achieve security of small businesses by forming *Polisi Jamii* groups. According to Kappeler, Gainess and Schaefer (2012)); community policing can encourage community security practises involving small businesses by influencing the entrepreneurs to engage the police to resolve their business problems in their areas. Problem solving is an essential part of community policing. Community Policing Officers (CPOs) must initiate efforts to deal with the conditions that cause crime and negatively affect the quality of life in a community. This process can be successful when initiated by the members of the community themselves. With regard to this study, the role of community policing in the security of small businesses in the selected localities in Dar es Salaam used guidelines propounded by Kappeler, et al (2012).

2. Methodology

The study adopted a case study design that sought to comprehend human involvement, to disclose the process by which people paradigm meanings about their world and to report what those meanings are (Creswell, 2024). A case study research design was selected because it was useful in making a detailed examination of the role of community policing in selected localities of Dar es Salaam. Snowball sampling procedure was followed to select members of the community, specifically small businessmen and women, police officers and street executive officers. The study used interview, focus group discussions (FGD) and documentary review in gathering primary and secondary data. Structured and semi-structured interview schedules were designed for the purpose of acquiring data from participants.

The study interviewed twelve participants including members of community policing and petty traders. Focus groups comprised of twelve residents of each of the following municipalities: Kinondoni, Ilala and Temeke. FGD solicited information on the role of community policing in ensuring security of small businesses. Documentary review was employed to collect information from

¹ This is Kiswahili for 'community policing' in Tanzania.

secondary sources such as minutes of related meetings, official speeches, newspaper articles, magazines, journal articles, research papers and crimes reports (Kothari, 2020). The data collected were categorized into themes and content groups based on the information provided by participants in order to get the insight of the communities regarding the role of community policing in the maintenance of security.

3. Findings and discussion

The day and night patrols of the community policing agents have succeeded to encourage development of small businesses in several localities of Dar es Salaam City. Small business owners were found to have worked hand in hand with the community policing agents in creating the environment of trust, and cooperation between the police and the community in finding sustainable solutions to the citizen's grievances related to crime (Kasika, 2025). In the mid of 2006, the Tanzania police force decided to introduce a people centered security system by encouraging people to volunteer to participate in crime reduction within their areas. The notion is supported by Wang (2009)'s theory of involvement and engagement of community in improving the environment of small businesses. The police decided to give seminars to all groups from communities which volunteered to be community policing agents (Kenneth, 2013).

It is very important for the community to be educated about the relationship between the police and the community as this helps in promoting community security and effective policing (Kappeler, Gainess & Schaefer, 2012). This study found that, practically, police officers depend on the collaboration of community residents to get information about crimes in their respective business areas. It is therefore the responsibility of the small business communities to collaborate with the police to develop solutions to combat misconduct and address complaint related to insecurity or treats to peace. Similarly, community member's readiness to trust the police depends on whether they believe that police actions reflect community values and incorporate the principles of procedural justice and legitimacy.

One of the findings of this study is that in Tanzania, community policing has two wide scopes. Firstly, it establishes an effort to improve public perceptions of the police in order to facilitate intelligence gathering and public cooperation with the Tanzania Police Force (TPF). Secondly, it is a method for the organization of

citizens to take responsibility for their own security through “*Ulinzi Shirikishi*” and “*Utii bila shuruti*”³. According to the then Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) Ahmed Msangi, “*It is the responsibility of the community policing (agents) to educate and motivate residents to participate in planning and executing strategies that will ensure peace and security.*” The community policing agents have brought changes to their communities by protecting people and providing security to small businesses in their areas (Kasika,2025).

Community policing has been very popular amongst localities in Shinyanga region, in the western part of Tanzania. The people of Shinyanga formulated community policing under the name of “*Sungusungu*” for the purposes of reduction of violent crimes and arresting suspected thieves, particularly due to recurring incidences of cattle stealing in Shinyanga. Persons accused of committing crime were subjected to rigorous investigation and punishment. In some cases, an entire village cooperated by ostracizing the accused individuals and their families until they were ready to confess their misdeeds to the *sungusungu* committee. Furthermore, the history of popular participation in local policing is credited with facilitating the introduction of community policing today (Charlotte, 2014). This practice was also found in the localities of Dar es Salaam. In addition, the Dar es Salaam Police Force sharpen the effectiveness of the *Sungusugu* community policing by providing rules and regulations of operation during patrols. To a great extent, the introduction of night patrols has reduced crime affecting small enterprises (Simtowe, 2024).

Reduction of crimes in localities of Dar es Salaam has been realized since the beginning of the *ulinzi shirikishi* through community policing. The partnership between the communities and the police force has increased mutual trust which has led to the minimization of crime rates reported and improvement of the police attitude towards their job. Community policing requires proactive action such as regular accessibility of police officers when required by the community (Kasika,2025). Responses from interviews revealed that the police officers believe that through collaboration with the community they can combat and manage crime more effectively. When opening the seminar of religious leaders of Dar es Salam in 2012, the then Inspector General of Police commented that although the police officers were fulfilling their duties of doing physical patrol, religious leaders had the

² This is a security philosophy of engaging communities in security undertakings in cooperation with the police.

³ It means voluntary observance of the law.

responsibility of conducting spiritual patrols by preaching peace and security to their followers in order to enforce obedience to the law without compulsion. The statement was received well by people of Dar es Salaam at the end results has been reduction in crime rates in many localities and particularly in areas dominated by small enterprises.

Moreover, the sustaining of small businesses in Dar es Salaam localities has been contributed to by community policing. It should be noted that the responsibility of fighting against crimes is a joint duty of the Police Force, communities and other stakeholders in order to prevent all sorts of crimes. The campaign of crime reduction in Dar es Salaam has enabled the increase of the revenue to the Dar es Salaam city council. According to the Tanzania Revenue Authority, during the financial year 2022/23 the council collected TZS 23.66 trillion (Simtowe, 2024). Dar es Salaam region collected 86.4% of total revenue of TZS 23.66 trillion in 2023.2024. Kariakoo area has increased the number of small and medium entrepreneurs up to 30,000 in 2023 from 10,000 in 2022. The increasing number of small-scale entrepreneurs, to the great extent, increases revenue in the country, implying also that there is growth of income to the small and medium entrepreneurs (Pallangyo, 2023).

Further, it was noted that the effectiveness of the relationship between police and community policing has played a notable role towards the development of small and medium enterprises in Dar es Salaam localities. In fact, community policing is an idea of security management style and an organizational strategy that promotes opportunities for everybody to get work that is productive and delivers a fair income. Since the roles of the police shift from incident driven law enforcers to problem solvers and facilitators, community policing is a proactive solution based and community driven strategy.

Data from interviews showed that security sector reforms lead to the inclusion of private security companies as implementers of the community policing strategy. There are several private security companies that provide security services. These security companies guard shops, markets, offices and other places so as to ensure security in the communities in different localities of Dar es Salaam such as Tandika, Tegeta, Kinondoni, Msasani, Buguruni etc. These security companies are comparatively more advanced in technology and also better equipped. Most of the people working in the private security companies are from the community of Dar es Salaam. The notable private security companies in Dar es Salaam are SGA Security, KK Security, Ultimate Security, Knight Security and many more. These private security companies have been the catalyst for the increase of small and medium enterprises in Dar es Salaam (Kasika, 2025). The residents of Dar es Salaam

have witnessed the mushrooming of petty trading and other small businesses in the busiest streets of Dar es Salaam such as Azikiwe, Msimbazi, Congo, Manzese, Machinga complex, Karume, Buguruni and Mbagala. This is evidence that the introduction of community policing attracted many Dar es Salaam residents into small businesses to earn their living.

Another notable contribution of community policing is in the formation of vigilant youth groups to participate in combating community problems. This step has greatly improved the lives of small and medium entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam. The police cannot successfully combat crimes without community participation. Through the strategy of community participation (In Kiswahili “*Ulinzi – Shirikishi*”) the police have succeeded to organized patrols in many streets in different localities of Dar es Salaam. They have encouraged community members to participate in crime prevention by encouraging them to form local security groups which conduct night patrols, arrest suspected offenders, and facilitate dispute resolution within their streets (Andrew and Issa, 2025) It was instructed that communities should encourage the formation of youth groups to forge guard units which were supposed to be registered at the nearby police station and given seminar on community policing. A street executive officer in Kigogo area asserted that:

Before the introduction of community policing, the area of Kigogo valley was notorious for crime. However, the community policing guard units have succeeded to almost clear the threats of crime and robbery in the area.

4. Conclusion and recommendation

This study has revealed that community policing is playing a major role in security and protection of local communities in Dar es Salaam. Community policing as a strategy towards crime prevention has three elements of partnership, problem solving and organizational transformation. In Dar es Salaam, it can be concluded that community policing strategy in crime prevention is operationalized by the police working hand in hand with the community knowing that the community is more aware of every individual. Vigilant groups as well as private security companies are in place complementing the work of the police.

Furthermore, the specific findings of this study are aligned with past experience which reports that for the police to be effective and successful in crime prevention there must be an active partnership between them and the community members. In Dar es Salaam this partnership was found to enhance the development of small enterprises. On the basis of the finding of this study, it is recommended that the police need to continue mobilizing the community to participate in safety and

security issues. For the police to be effective and successful in prevention of crime, there must be an active and continuous partnership between the police and the community members.

The government should encourage community policing, especially among law enforcement agencies and local communities. The police should consider providing incentives for innovation and creativity at the local level, specifically at the local police level. Innovations in security need to be recognized and provided for in the police force operating procedures. The police force should restructure its organizational hierarchy to fit the current mode of strategy. Community policing officers should enjoy the freedom, recognition and autonomy to operate as community-based problem solvers who work directly with the community making neighbourhoods better and safer places to live in.

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Zambia's Diplomatic Engagements in Southern Africa: From Liberation Struggles to Economic Diplomacy.

By

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Abstract

Zambia's foreign policy landscape has been greatly influenced by regional and international dynamics. In the immediate post-independence era, Zambia's foreign policy focused on combating colonialism, racism, apartheid, and neo-colonialism in the region mainly based on Presidential pronouncements. Its diplomatic design aimed at safeguarding the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. Grounded on desk research of various sources, this paper uses Liberalism and Constructivism theories to examine Zambia's diplomatic engagement in Southern Africa since independence (1964) to 2025, highlighting Zambia's foreign policy impact on regional stability and prosperity. The aim is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Zambia's diplomatic strategies and their impact on regional dynamics. The analysis indicates that Zambia's diplomatic efforts have been instrumental in shaping the political environment of Southern Africa and promoting collaboration among regional nations.

Keywords: *Economic Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Liberation Struggles, Regional Integration.*

1. Introduction

The struggle for independence in Southern Africa has had an impact on Zambia's foreign policy and its diplomatic activities. Zambia has consistently emphasised solidarity with other African nations. This is manifested through its backing of liberation movements and its promotion of increased autonomy and self-determination on the global platform. By adhering to these principles, Zambia has

established itself as a pivotal figure in advancing peace, security, and development in Africa. Zambia's consistent efforts to foster positive relationships in the Southern African region establish it as a dependable partner and ally (GRZ, 2019). Mukwena and Sumali (2016) holds that mutual respect and a cooperative strategy have been the primary drivers of Zambia's diplomatic engagements, encompassing bilateral and multilateral interactions like collaborative peacekeeping missions and trade accords. This has led to enhanced connections through bilateral and trilateral partnerships within the Southern African region, such as the Zambia-Zimbabwe-Mozambique trilateral agreement, which has been instrumental in addressing regional security challenges and promoting economic cooperation in the region.

Furthermore, Zambia's commitment to promoting regional stability and economic growth is exemplified by its leadership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), especially in the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, which has played a crucial role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in the region. Through active involvement in peacekeeping missions such as the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and trade agreements like the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Trade Area, Zambia has demonstrated its commitment to building positive relationships with neighbouring countries and fostering economic growth in the Southern African region. For both SADC and COMESA, Zambia has is a founding member. In fact, to acknowledge and appreciate Zambia's role in the formation of these regional bodies, member states decided to have COMESA Secretariat in Lusaka, Zambia's capital city. As a result, Zambia has been able to leverage its partnerships to address a wide range of global challenges, highlighting the importance of collaboration and cooperation among countries in the global south.

Therefore, this paper takes a closer look at Zambia's diplomatic engagements in Southern Africa and its impact on international relations. In particular, it explores how Zambia's partnerships with neighbouring countries have influenced regional stability and economic development through economic diplomacy (Lee and Hocking, 2010). For example, just recently, on 1st August 2025, Zambia signed two Memoranda of Understanding with Botswana to further strengthen their bilateral relationship and foster increased cooperation between the two nations. This followed the inaugural session of the Bi-National Commission (BNC) held in Lusaka on the same day. The BNC covers political, economic, social, diplomatic, and security matters. The Botswana President, Duma Gideon Boko, was in Zambia for a two-day state visit from 1-2nd August 2025.

2. Materials and Methodology

Mukwena and Sumaili (2016) highlights the challenges of conducting absolute primary research on Zambia's foreign policy due to the closed and secretive nature of its Foreign Service, which limits the study of Zambia's diplomatic relations. Hence, this paper relied on desk research from a range of sources including books, journal articles, government records, conference papers, and ministerial briefings. Some personal insights from former and serving diplomats with over a decade of experience in Southern Africa also enriched this paper, offering a broad geographic perspective on Zambia's role in enhancing regional stability and development.

The study utilised Liberalism and Constructivism theories of international relations to conduct a comprehensive analysis and establish an organised framework. Meiser (2018) posits that liberalism is founded on the moral premise that the paramount objective of government is to safeguard the fundamental rights of individuals namely, life, liberty, and property. Therefore, liberals prioritise the welfare of the individual as an essential foundation of a fair political system. Although these concerns mostly pertain to domestic politics, liberals also attach some significance to the field of international relations due to the potential impact of a state's foreign actions on domestic liberty. Therefore, this theory helps to elucidate Zambia's steadfast diplomatic commitment to promoting and achieving people's demands for self-determination, emancipation and sovereignty in Southern African countries. Zambia's advocacy for political independence in Southern African member states was inseparable from its national interest and security. Its diplomatic actions for decolonisation and safety of the region were and have remained relentlessly evident to date. This observation is validated by Zambia's 2019 foreign policy document which unequivocally states that:

“Zambia shall uphold and protect fundamental rights and freedoms as recognised in the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia and international legal instruments. The fundamental rights include the right to life, personal liberty, right not to be subjected to torture, inhumane or degrading treatment and the right to protection from deprivation of property. The fundamental freedoms include freedoms of assembly and association, expression, conscience and movement. The inviolability of rights of the country's citizens, be it at home or abroad, is an important principle for Zambia. To this end, the policy shall ensure that all fundamental rights and freedoms of Zambians are protected both at home and abroad. The fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens of other countries living in Zambia shall also be protected in line with Laws of Zambia and the International Law” (GRZ, 2019: p. 5).

Thus, it was relevant to adopt liberalism as a theory to help craft and explain the context of this study.

On the other hand, Constructivism theory helped to explain that the social world is of our making (Onuf, 1989; Theys, 2018). For example, Onuf (1989) observes that actors such as politicians and influential citizens continually shape and sometimes reshape the very nature of international relations through their actions and interactions. Constructivism sees the world and what we know about the world as socially constructed by people who inhabit it; usually pushing for their preferred interests and expectations and not necessarily for the common good. This is what minority white rule governments in Southern African region pursued for many years, excluding interests of the majority black people - the original owners of these countries. It is that excluding that spurred demands for self-determination and self-governance among the black people. Therefore, it is important to understand that the social relationship between Zambia and the rest of the Southern African countries is as a result of the shared experiences and understanding based on their historical interactions.

3. Findings and discussion

This section discusses Zambia's involvement in the liberation struggles of neighbouring countries, its role in Pan-Africanism, contributions to African diplomacy, and the significant impact of its humanitarian efforts for Southern African region. It also discusses Zambia's transition from supporting neighbouring countries after achieving their independence to focusing on economic diplomacy. Additionally, it provides an overview of how Zambia's diplomatic relations have influenced SADC and COMESA, ultimately shaping the regional economic and political landscape in Southern Africa.

3.1. Zambia's Diplomatic Efforts towards Liberation Struggles

Zambia's diplomatic engagement in Southern Africa has its roots in Pan-Africanism, an ideology that expressed a strong desire to have all African countries unite and attain self-rule (Nkrumah, 1963; Wallerstein, 1961; Adi and Sherwood, 2003). Shared by all African political leaders, the Pan-African ideology led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which encouraged independent African states to help those still under colonial rule to attain their independence (Clarke, 1974; Englebert, 2013). Zambia found it befitting to promote OAU's principles of ending colonial rule in Africa.

Upon attaining independence, Zambia's diplomatic efforts in Southern Africa primarily focused on combating colonialism, racism, apartheid, and neo-colonialism

in the region. Hence, during the leadership of Zambia's inaugural President, Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda (1964–1991), the country's diplomatic relations were predominantly defined by Pan-Africanism principles and a non-alignment position in international politics, strengthened by humanism ideology which emphasised the importance of man as the centre of all activity (GRZ, 2019). Over the years, Zambia's non-aligned status situated it well to mediate in many conflict situations, thus making it possible to bring peace and stability in those situations. Notable examples include the Angolan civil war which broke out in 1975 (Van der Waag, 2011) and the second Congo war in 1998.

Prior to this, Zambia mediated a peace settlement through the Lusaka Accord on 7th September 1974 between Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Portuguese government which was installed by Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, Portugal. The Lusaka Accord made Portugal to formally accept and recognize FRELIMO's representation for Mozambique's independence, as specified in the Lusaka Accord for transfer of powers. Zambia also facilitated peace talks between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which culminated in peaceful settlement under the Lusaka Protocol, signed on 20th November 1994. This process received international support notably from Zimbabwe's President, Robert Mugabe and South African President, Nelson Mandela (Vines, 1999).

Similarly, Zambia played a pivotal role in mediating a ceasefire in the Congo war. First, various international organisations, including the United Nations (UN), met in Lusaka on 21st to 27th June 1999 and drafted a conflict resolution. Then on 10th July 1999 heads of state from Angola, Congo DR, Namibia, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe met in Lusaka to sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Although hostilities continued between belligerent states, the conflict was eventually resolved and peaceful settlement achieved in 2003 (Ngolet, 2011; Soderlund, Briggs, Pierre and Roberts, 2013). Clearly, it can be seen that Zambia played and continues to play an important role in bringing peace to the Southern African region.

Chongo 2016) highlights that from early 1960s into the 1970s, Zambia became a member of the OAU, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and effectively supported battles for Southern African liberation organisations to gain independence by compelling white minority governments to engage in negotiations that led to the establishment of black majority rule.

According to Chongo (2016), Zambia employed a two-pronged approach using military action, such as supporting armed conflict strategically, and diplomatic efforts to achieve black majority control in the region. However, due to economic motivations, there was greater inclination towards pursuing diplomatic techniques rather than using violence. In any case, Kaunda's administration strongly believed in non-violence engagement. Hence, Zambia supported armed conflict only to the extent that it was deemed essential to compel the white minority governments to engage in negotiations. The OAU encouraged African countries which had gained their independence to support independence liberation movements in their respective regions. This was seen as one strategy that would bring political emancipation to the majority who were still oppressed under the colonial minority regimes. In Southern Africa, Zambia took the leadership role in collaboration with Botswana, Malawi, and Tanzania who together formed the Front-Line States to engage with colonial governments in the region.

Despite numerous provocations from Zimbabwe and South Africa, the Zambian government used non-violent means to engage with colonial administrations. Diplomacy was used to validate liberation movements and advocate for policies that advanced black majority rule in Southern Africa in international organizations like the OAU, United Nations (UN), Commonwealth of Nations, NAM, and Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AASO). Chongo (2016) holds that Zambian diplomats at the UN played a prominent role in advocating for decisive actions against white minority regimes that deprived Africans of their right to self-determination. They supported economic sanctions and exerted diplomatic pressure on western governments to persuade white minority regimes to embrace black majority rule. This resulted in Zambia hosting the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States in Lusaka from 14-16th April 1969. This Summit drafted the Lusaka Manifesto, which singled out apartheid in South Africa and its affiliate minority white rule regimes to relinquish their colonial minority rule practice and white supremacy tendencies.

Nevertheless, this approach exhibited limited efficacy and created numerous challenges and incongruities. Being a significant participant in the region's liberation movements, Zambia consistently provided assistance to independence liberation groups (

Table 1). This support included acknowledging their existence, endorsing their political goals, facilitating transportation and broadcasting, offering financial and material aid and accommodating their leaders in Zambia. For example, the

Namibian SWAPO and South African ANC had their offices housed in Zambia until these two countries attained their independence from white minority rule to usher in black majority rule on 21st March 1990 and 27th April 1994, respectively.

Despite the challenges and obstacles encountered during this involvement, Zambia remained resolute and committed to supporting these groups. In addition, Chongo (2016) highlights that Zambia extended diplomatic assistance to leaders of liberation movements, which encompassed facilitating peace negotiations and pushing for their acknowledgment in global fora.

However, it is imperative to acknowledge that the aforementioned sources of support ought to be construed within the framework of the Liberation Committee, of which Zambia promptly joined as an engaged member subsequent to attaining independence. Moreover, this development subsequently resulted in Zambia (a front-line state) emerging as a sanctuary for numerous individuals engaged in the struggle for independence in their respective countries, while concurrently bolstering its diplomatic relations within the region. This support also provided the foundation for Zambia's foreign policy objectives in Southern Africa, highlighting the significance of keeping amicable relations with neighbouring countries.

Table 1 shows Southern African countries where Zambia actively participated to bring their independence, as a Frontline State (Macmillan, 2009).

Table 1: Liberation Movements supported by Zambia.

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Liberation Group</i> |
|----------------|--|
| Angola | <i>National Unions for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)</i> |
| Mozambique | <i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)</i> <i>(In English: Liberation Front of Mozambique)</i> |
| Namibia | <i>South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)</i> |
| South Africa | <i>African National Congress (ANC)</i> |
| Zimbabwe | <i>Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)</i> |

Macmillan (2009) argues that apart from actively supporting ANC, FRELIMO, UNITA, SWAPO, and ZAPU during their independence struggles and subsequent civil wars, Zambia also served as a host country for migrants from these countries, many of whom received their education in Zambia. Both ANC and SWAPO headquarters were housed in Lusaka with ZAPU having military bases in the country. This highlights the country's role in promoting independence, solidarity and racial equality in Southern Africa.

3.2. Zambia's Contribution to Pan-Africanism and African Diplomacy

Pan-Africanism is often regarded as a movement, however, to some it is an ideology (Nkrumah, 1963). For some people, it symbolises the pursuit of an African sense of self, whilst for others, it denotes the concept of negritude. It is from this aspect that the concept of African diplomacy was drawn. According to Nagar & Nganje (2016), some individuals describe it as the African desire for a continent that is independent from foreign control and dominance. This vision includes a united African continent where leaders are able to strategize for the organised advancement and well-being of its people. The early foundations of Pan-Africanism were primarily rooted in racial concerns, but it is important to acknowledge that nowadays it has evolved beyond solely focusing on race to include economic and social emancipation.

The most important origins can be traced back to the inception of the slave trade, a time during which Africans, both within their homeland and in foreign lands, experienced the loss of their national identity. They experienced a loss of their cultural heritage and, thus, their individual sense of self. According to Anthony (2005), the primary goal of Pan-Africanism is re-establishment of national identity and the preservation of the dignity of African people. It also aimed to reinstate the rightful position of Africa and Africans in the analysis of global history. Consequently, Pan-Africanism served as a significant catalyst connecting people of African descent. In the late 1960s, the phrase Pan-Africanism emerged as a concept denoting the complete self-governance and autonomy of the entire African continent (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). Pan-Africanism was a response to the pervasive racism and intolerance prevalent in many western nations. Africans faced escalating exclusion and discrimination, especially in western nations, where they were subjected to exploitation and disdain. Pan-Africanism was thus an endeavour to discover an enduring resolution to the challenges they were encountering.

Therefore, in pursuit of African goals, Zambia, led by President Kaunda, made a deliberate choice to take risks regarding the conflicts and tensions associated with the liberation movements in Southern Africa and the continent as a whole. Zambia displayed unwavering determination to achieve a free Africa, leading to significant

diplomatic involvement in both Southern Africa and the continent as a whole (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). President Kenneth Kaunda was the first African leader to recognise the complete possibilities for political influence that arose from the relaxation of tensions in Southern Africa. Anglin (1975) states that President Kaunda demonstrated bravery and responded quickly with creative ideas to address potential dangers in order to achieve the desired rewards which were substantial.

Zambia conducted significant diplomatic missions to address colonialism in Africa, while also serving as a mediator between the white minority and colonial governments, and the guerrilla organisations seeking to remove these administrations. Kaunda's administration epitomised the authentic essence of Pan-Africanism, as he willingly endangered his own country which offered sanctuary to liberation movements in Southern Africa and its people. Clearly, his advocacy for Front-line States to overcome apartheid and white minority rule in Southern Africa enhanced Zambia's international image and created more allies.

3.3. Humanitarian Diplomacy

Zambia's primary objective has been to foster regional and global peace and stability. The Zambian foreign policy document of 2019 explicitly states that Zambia will endorse regional, continental, and global initiatives aimed at promoting peace and security. Even after achieving decolonisation and end of liberation struggles, Zambia continues to render assistance aimed at achieving peace and stability in the Southern African region. These efforts encompass a range of actions, including military support; initiatives focused on peaceful conflict resolution; endeavours to combat human and drug trafficking, money laundering, international terrorism, racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance, as well as endeavours to address humanitarian challenges that arise from conflict situations and natural disasters. For example, Zambia has played a significant role in mediating conflicts in the Great Lakes region, which includes some member states of Southern Africa.

According to Vines (1999) Zambia has actively engaged in UN peacekeeping operations e.g. in Mozambique, Rwanda, and Angola, and played significant roles in mediating peace agreements such as the Angolan Peace Agreement of 1994 (Lusaka Protocol) and the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The Lusaka Protocol, signed in Lusaka, Zambia on October 31, 1994, was aimed at ending the Angolan civil war by incorporating and disarming UNITA operatives and initiating a process of national reconciliation.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees report (UNHCR, 2023), Zambia is committed to achieving peace and stability in the region and has invested heavily in humanitarian diplomacy by providing assistance to over 105,000 refugees, asylum-seekers, and individuals of concern. The majority of these individuals are from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the broader Great Lakes region, as well as past refugees from Angola and Rwanda, (UNHCR, 2023). Zambia hosts four UNHCR offices in Lusaka, Solwezi, Kawambwa, and Kaoma. To enhance effective refugee responses, the Zambian government has proposed consolidating all government departments responsible for refugee management under a unified organization. This would ensure all refugee-related activities fall under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees within the Ministry of Home Affairs, overseen and coordinated by designated refugee officers. The Zambian government has specialised officers in all refugee settlements, including educators, healthcare providers, midwives, agriculture extension officers, water, sanitation, hygiene experts, police officers, forestry officers, community development social welfare officers, livestock officers, and environmental health technicians. The central government's allocation of funds for education, health, and agriculture has had a positive impact on refugees.

3.4. Shift to Economic Diplomacy and Regional Integration

After independence of Southern Africa, countries in the region shifted from liberation struggles to economic cooperation, expansion and maintaining political stability of their homelands. This shift was not only regional but continental. Since the aftermath of independence liberation struggles, regional integration became cardinal to the African continent, having been initiated from the OAU Charter and the Lusaka Manifesto. and clearly consolidated by the Abuja Treaty of 1991 which delivered guiding principles and objectives, and a region-wide structure to support the integration outline. Zambia has been an integral and highly dependable partner in all this.

Mukwena and Sumaili (2016) explains that Zambia's diplomatic efforts since the transition to multi-party democracy in 1991, led by President Fredrick J.T. Chiluba, have mostly focused on establishing economic diplomatic relations and promoting peace and stability in Southern Africa. President Chiluba implemented a more extensive and liberalised economic approach in Zambia's international relations, initiating a shift from political liberation and integration to economic diplomacy (Lee and Hocking, 2010). In the same period, Zambia strongly advocated for human rights, democracy, transparency, and good governance. Furthermore, Zambia represented the interests and ambitions of developing states in the UN and other global conventions. The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)

government, during President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and President Rupiah Bwezani Banda's administration, ensured that Zambia remained engaged in global affairs. During their terms, Zambia played a significant role in promoting the SADC integration and development agenda. Mwanawasa administration prioritised good governance and the rule of law, placing particular emphasis on combating corruption. This approach successfully attracted foreign direct investment to Zambia and strengthened economic diplomacy (GRZ, 2019).

Since September 2011, when President Michael Chilufya Sata took office under the Patriotic Front (PF) Administration, Zambia has continued implementing a proactive and practical foreign policy which focuses on promoting trade, attracting foreign investment, and presenting Zambia as a secure and peaceful nation. Under the PF administration, Zambia push economic diplomacy and pursue a foreign policy based on the values of mutuality, common interest, and respect. The inaugural Foreign Policy Paper of Zambia was officially adopted in January 1996. Nevertheless, significant changes in the political, economic, financial, and social aspects at local, regional, and global levels have compelled the country to readjust its foreign policy (GRZ, 2019).

Under President Hakainde Hichilema's leadership, under the United Party for National Development (UPND), the administration has intensified economic diplomacy and adopted it as a crucial part of Zambia's diplomatic efforts extending beyond Southern Africa (GRZ, 2023). According to Lee and Hocking (2010), economic diplomacy is predominantly perceived as a form of intergovernmental activity carried out by a state with to promote economic interests of that state in other foreign states and the global economy. According to Berridge (2005), economic diplomacy entails the active pursuit of economic security within a fiercely competitive international system. Zambia has enhanced its economic diplomacy and its foreign policy is grounded in the values of reciprocal common interest and mutual respect.

Zambia is no longer involved in aiding neighbouring countries in their liberation struggle but rather engaging in trade and exploring potential benefits that can be derived from its relationships with them. Zambia's economic diplomacy encompasses initiatives focused on promoting increased manufacturing, value addition, exports and investments, engaging in global economic governance, and advocating for changes in the global economic system. Bilateral diplomacy frequently facilitates export and investment promotion (GRZ, 2023). Currently, the UPND government actively engages in global economic governance by advocating

for debt relief and seeking to influence changes in the global economic system. These efforts are often carried out in a multilateral setting, which reflect Zambia's distinct interest in pursuing multilateral diplomacy in a multilateral global community. Furthermore, utilisation of Zambian embassies and consulates worldwide has been prioritised for engaging in economic diplomacy in order to advance the country's economic objectives (GRZ, 2023).

Zambia's main goal in its economic diplomatic efforts, both within Southern Africa and beyond, is to stimulate economic growth and development by attracting trade and investment in Zambia through a well-organised and coordinated strategy led by the private sector. Like diplomacy in general, this approach aims to establish, mould, and oversee a long-term framework of international connections in order to safeguard Zambia's interests.

This implies that Zambia's economic diplomacy aims to advance economic interests by employing diplomatic strategies. This is envisioned to expand economic activities which will immediately contribute to job creation that will positively impact the economic well-being of Zambians. The Zambian government is currently developing its economy by capitalising on its history of global trade, substantial inflows of foreign investment, a vibrant private sector, and a continuous agenda of economic restructuring. To ensure its continued prosperity, the country is developing robust methods to safeguard its global economic interests. Economic diplomacy plays a crucial role in promoting the well-being of Zambians by promoting free trade, stimulating economic expansion, attracting investments, and supporting commercial activities. This aligns specifically with the national development objectives of the UPND party. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation plays a significant role in this matter, although other sectors such as the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development; and Ministry of Green Economy are also crucial for a coordinated effort in the country's economic advancement.

When it comes to implementing trade agreements, the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI) takes the lead. This ministry is responsible for facilitating and regulating trade and industrial activities, with the aim of improving the sectors' contribution to sustainable socioeconomic growth and development for the Zambian population. The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) an agency under MCTI, founded in 2006 according to Act No. 11 of 2006, is directly responsible for facilitating economic expansion, commerce and investment, as well as implementing a streamlined, proficient, and synchronised plan for private sector-

driven economic development. The agency is tasked with the responsibility of fostering a globally competitive Zambian economy by implementing innovative strategies that encourage the development of advanced skills, productive investments, and enhanced trade (GRZ, 2023).

In diplomatic discussions with China, Zambia agreed that the Chinese government will continue to provide support for regional initiatives, particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and tourism. It is envisioned that this support will help Zambia become a central connectivity centre in Southern Africa (GRZ, 2023). On 24th October 2023, during Zambia's 59th Independence Anniversary celebration, Dr. Samia Suluhu Hassan, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, re-emphasised the strong and enduring values and visions shared between Zambia and Tanzania. These shared values and visions have their origins in the time of Founding Presidents, Dr. Kenneth David Buchizya Kaunda (Zambia) and Dr. Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania. During her state visit to Zambia (23-25th October 2023), Dr. Samia Hassan, Tanzania generously allocated 20 hectares of land to Zambia to establish a dry port in Kwana saying:

"We envisage that this move will further boost trade between our two countries and create more trade opportunities for our two peoples. This is the gift from Tanzania as you celebrate your independence."

Dr. Hassan as Zambia marked its 59th Independence Day on 24th October 2023 (Huaxia, 2023). This initiative is part of Zambia's broader strategy of expanding regional trade and logistics network, while leveraging its strategic location as a land-linked nation. President Hichilema's administration wants to position Zambia as a central hub for the southern African region.

Tanzania also extended the storage duration to 45 days for Zambian goods at the Dar-es-Salaam Port to reduce congestion and delays. These measures would effectively address storage difficulties encountered by Zambian importers and exporters and will possibly help to cut costs of doing business. This gesture unequivocally demonstrates and underscores the robust cordial bond that exists between the Zambia and Tanzania due to their amicable diplomatic ties.

Furthermore, within the context of ongoing diplomatic activities in the region, Zambia and South Africa also committed their governments to utilise their interconnected relations to promote business investments in areas mutually advantageous for regional progress. This includes exploring opportunities arising from the global energy crisis where Africa possesses a distinctive advantage as a

major hub that hosts a significant number of essential minerals required for the development of sustainable energy technology.

Therefore, it is imperative for African nations to collaborate and seize this opportunity to prioritise enhancing the value of their minerals through beneficiation, promoting domestic manufacturing, and advancing agro-processing. The history of Zambia-South Africa bilateral relations is based on shared values and aspirations for a more promising future. Over time, the cooperative endeavours of these two nations have cultivated economic alliances, resulting in signing of more than 20 accords in a range of significant domains. Furthermore, the two nations consistently collaborate within the frameworks of SADC, the AU, the UN, and other platforms to promote peace, stability, and sustainable development, while recognising the interconnectedness of these objectives. These continued diplomatic ties will address both bilateral affairs and regional, continental, and global topics that are of shared importance. Diplomatic consultations hold significant relevance as they allow Zambia and South Africa to assess their current areas of cooperation and establish new ones in response to the evolving global landscape. Both nations are actively engaging in enhanced trade and investment to improve the well-being of their citizens and strengthen their achievements in peace and security. This is aimed at creating a favourable climate for conducting business safely between the two countries.

During their 2023 bilateral talks, Zambia and Botswana discussed the need for enhanced development cooperation. Despite their short borders, the two nations have played a significant role in the region's history by liberating Southern Africa. The Kazungula Bridge and One Stop Border Post have transformed the border into a channel for regional integration and trade within the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Diplomatic relations between Zambia and Botswana demonstrate successful regional integration through collaborative efforts in commerce and development initiatives. Both countries have unique capabilities and resources, with Zambia's abundant arable land and favourable rainfall making it well-suited for agriculture, and Botswana's significant advancements in the livestock sector. As noted earlier, on 1st August 2025 Zambia and Botswana held their inaugural session of the Bi-National Commission (BNC) held in Lusaka and committed to enhance their bilateral engagement. The Botswana President, Duma Gideon Boko, was in Zambia for a two-day state visit from 1-2nd August 2025.

The Nacala Port in Mozambique, renovated and upgraded in 2023, has significantly improved regional economic diplomacy in Southern Africa. The port, a symbol of the Zambia-Mozambique-Malawi Growth Triangle, will enhance operational

efficiency, promote safer and more competitive transportation, reduce transit costs, and ensure expedited goods delivery. It serves as a vital gateway for Zambia's direct route for imports and exports, resulting in lower transportation costs. The Nacala Development Corridor agreement will strengthen trade facilitation and promote socio-economic integration in the Southern African region. The upgraded infrastructure at Nacala Port and the Nacala Development Corridor agreements will also benefit various economic sectors, including agriculture, tourism, mining, energy, fisheries, and livestock. Zambia's proactive engagement in economic diplomacy has created opportunities for investment and the realization of its goal of becoming a prominent economic centre in the region. The establishment of the Lobito Corridor in Angola and the Zambia-DRC gateway has also led to the development of international gateways.

3.5. Membership in SADC

Zambia, a member of the Front-line States, played a crucial role in the establishment of the Southern African Coordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980, aiming to reduce economic dependence on the apartheid regime. The SADCC's objectives extended beyond political emancipation to promote regional development and economic prosperity. In 1992, it was renamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after the majority of Southern African countries achieved political liberation. Today, SADC remains a vital organization in the region.

According to SADC (2020), SADC's goal is to attain development, peace, security, economic growth, poverty reduction, and enhance the quality of life for people in Southern Africa. The primary objective is to support marginalised individuals through regional integration founded on democratic principles, equity, and sustainable growth. As of July 2023, SADC has expanded its membership from nine to 16 states, with a population of 340 million and a combined GDP of US\$720 billion. SADC has a crucial role in international relations and the global economy, serving as a key part of the African Economic Community by fostering integration throughout the continent. Zambia has continuously shown its dedication to the values and objectives of SADC, resulting to constant growth and improvement in its economic diplomatic activities.

Zambia's enduring qualities of peace, stability, unity, and economic progress have established it as a highly regarded and influential participant in the region and beyond. Zambia has held the position of Chairperson of SADC and its different branches. This leadership role has led to notable accomplishments in the region, such as the successful transition of power in the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC) after the 2018 general elections. Zambia has played a significant role in mediating peace in the region to promote political and economic stability. Zambia's involvement is evident in multiple SADC Protocols and procedures, which it has ratified and overseen, including the implementation of the SADC Gender Protocol and the establishment of the SADC Free Trade Area. These efforts aim to enhance the quality of life for the citizens.




Figure 1: SADC Member States

Source: <https://www.sadc.int/member-states> © 2024

Zambia has placed a high priority on industrialization, trade, infrastructure development, and agriculture to facilitate access to regional and international markets. The country recognises the importance of maintaining peace and security for a prosperous economy, as well as promoting gender and youth development in line with the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. Zambia places high value on building trade relations with other countries, including infrastructure (e.g. one stop border offices) to support trade seamlessly across Zambia's borders.

This follows Zambia's firm belief that trade enhances cordial bilateral relations between nations (GRZ, 2023). It is a well-recognized truth that nations who trade with each other are most likely to maintain peaceful interactions among them. In

short, trade is a smart and strategic pillar to building peace and security architecture among nations because no one is interested in losing their investment due to instability.




Figure 2: COMESA Member States

Source: COMESA Countries - Search Images (bing.com)

3.6. Membership in COMESA

COMESA is a regional organisation of 21 African member states. Its prime objective is to foster regional integration by facilitating trade and commerce and boosting the utilisation of natural and human resources for the collective advantage of all individuals in the region. Prior to becoming COMESA, organisation was originally formed in 1981 as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa, under OAU Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. The current COMESA was established in 1994 as a successor to the PTA. The PTA aimed to capitalise on a larger market size, foster collaboration among regions with

shared heritage and future, and facilitate enhanced social and economic cooperation (COMESA, 2018). COMESA is one of the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognised by the African Union (AU).

GRZ (2019) holds the view that COMESA serves as a prominent venue for Zambia to actively participate in economic diplomacy. Therefore, Zambia attaches considerable importance to COMESA as a crucial regional market for its exports. In addition, Zambia serves as the host country for COMESA secretariat. Zambia strongly backs COMESA's efforts in achieving regional integration by promoting the private sector's active utilisation of the business prospects provided by COMESA. Moreover, Zambia encourages COMESA to serve as a platform for establishing and strengthening unified African and global positions on trade and development.

3.7. Diplomatic Effect of Dual Membership to SADC and COMESA

Since the 1990s, overlapping membership in regional bodies has become an area of concern. The ongoing overlaps have significant ramifications for trade, peace and security, especially in Africa (Lisakafu, 2018). African regional trade agreements have proliferated sporadically throughout the continent, leading to a complex network of overlapping memberships. Bhagwati (1991) refers to this phenomenon, observed in the African continent, as resembling a 'spaghetti bowl effect'. This description appears to be a precise reflection of the coinciding patterns in membership following the widespread establishment of regional trade blocs throughout the continent.

However, diplomatically, this has enabled Zambia to extend its cordial relations not only in Southern Africa but also to East Africa and further north, especially through COMESA trade platforms. Nevertheless, despite this positive connotation on its diplomatic relations, empirical evidence suggests that a nation with numerous affiliations frequently encounters challenges in managing regional agreements that provide significant social, economic, and security advantages. The presence of numerous regional members exacerbates the problem of losing concentration and undermining the primary objective and ambition of regional organisations for strategic collective security (Lisakafu, 2018).

Ancas (2011) notes that the tension and competition between regional organisations, as well as within regional organisations, have hindered potential success. This issue is particularly acute in Southern Africa. For many years, the existence of Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) like SADC and COMESA have not proven effective in promoting trade growth in Africa. Lack of political

commitment and policy reversals in implementing harmonisation rules, conflicting objectives of overlapping regional structures, and insufficient administrative resources have hindered their efforts (Khandelwal, 2004). Furthermore, Khandelwal emphasises that the allocation of resources and the availability of capacity have been significantly strained throughout the region. Administrative expenses are incurred due to the frequently intricate regulations governing the determination of origin. It is costly to pay and sustain several membership payments. The presence of conflicting objectives among competing arrangements has hindered development in various domains. Riding on the aspirations of the AfCFTA, a single trade block in Africa (AfCFTA, 2019), one hopes that these challenges will cease one day.

4. Implications of Zambia's diplomatic engagements in Southern Africa

During the first republic of Zambia (24th October 1964 to 25th August 1973), the country's foreign policy and diplomatic efforts were largely based on humanism principles. This approach challenged conventional international relations by emphasizing the importance of human dignity, rights, and well-being. Zambia's foreign policy towards the decolonisation of African states, led by President Kenneth Kaunda, prioritized these principles over the interests of the state and power institutions. Kaunda's dedication to the fight against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa led him to extend his efforts beyond Zambia's borders, aiding freedom fighters in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Kaunda was a staunch advocate of Pan-Africanism, emphasizing the importance of African unity and self-determination. His desire and commitment to empowering Africans to control their destiny and use their resources for their development demonstrates his support for liberation movements and promoting African unity and independence.

Although his endeavours and selflessness in this matter were acknowledged by African and global leaders, solidifying his reputation as a proponent of unity and liberation in Africa, had major implications on the country and the tenets of traditional international relations which emphasises states being the main actors in international relations, acting in their own self-interest within a self-help system. As viewed by realists, the international system is considered anarchic and lacks a central authority to enforce norms or settle conflicts. Drawing from this perspective, it can be deduced that Zambia overlooked these principles to the extent that its pursuit for decolonising Southern Africa returned with serious domestic implications both economic and political. According to Roberts, Williams, and Hobson (2024), Zambia experienced an economic boom in the early years of its

independence due to the steady increase in copper prices from 1964 to 1970, which was driven by the Vietnam War. Despite the stable economy, Zambia experienced increased spending on both domestic and external matters. Under President Kaunda's leadership, Zambia dedicated significant resources to external affairs related to freedom and decolonisation which strained the state's finances along with other domestic issues.

Roberts, *et al.* (2024) note that Zambia's economic situation deteriorated in the early 1970s. Copper remained the primary source of export revenue, however, its prices varied unpredictably and saw a lengthy decline in 1975. In 1973, the price of oil surged, leading to a quick increase in inflation, which was already severe. The government, dedicated to substantial spending, both public and private, responded by borrowing extensively from foreign sources and utilising reserves. Investment decreased, along with the efficiency of the transport network. Government regulation of the mining sector between 1969 and 1975 extended its existence unnaturally and expanded opportunities for corruption, as did state-owned enterprises established to encourage industrial variety. Eventually, Zambians lost faith in President Kaunda's leadership, they criticised his leadership and demanded for change of leadership. Continued economic upheavals led to food riots in Kitwe, Copperbelt Province in 1989. In October 1991, Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) resolutely defeated Kaunda and became the second republic President of Zambia.

Despite various changes in the Zambian political landscape, the country has not completely bounced back from its economic distress. The heavy public debt remains a threat to both long-term economic stability and the efficiency of civil services, including the foreign service. Zambia's foreign service was also heavily impacted by the economic and political shifts which were experienced during the first republic and has continued to hinder some of its diplomatic activities. Therefore, Zambia's diplomatic relations within Southern Africa have been hindered by two significant challenges: low resources and economic fragility.

Zambia faces constraints in terms of its restricted allocation of human, financial, and technological resources for diplomatic endeavours. As a result, Zambia encounters challenges in expanding its diplomatic engagements within the region. Mukwena and Sumaili (2016) notes that inadequate and quality of personnel assigned to Zambian missions, together with a shortage of staff that are interested in information and communication technology and website maintenance in Zambia, has resulted in difficulties and decreased diplomatic involvement in the region. This

is a significant obstacle that both the current diplomatic missions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs encounter.

Zambia's underperformance in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) is a cause for concern, particularly for foreign investors and the broader private sector. In turn, due to this reason, progress in diplomatic interactions continues to be difficult, despite the presence of highly efficient institutions. As global progress continues in electronic, the field of diplomacy is also evolving and placing more complex requirements on diplomats. As a result, the outcomes of diplomatic engagements are obstructed. Furthermore, the inadequate composition of Zambian delegations in international conferences and discussions has significantly influenced Zambia's foreign policy and diplomacy.

On the other hand, Zambia's inability to adequately address its economic issues and integrate new diplomatic approaches into its foreign policy has resulted in increasing difficulties in successfully and efficiently engaging with other countries in the area and maximising the benefits of economic diplomacy. The Zambian economy relies significantly on copper mining and rain-fed agricultural production, making it vulnerable to external risks like fluctuations in global copper prices and unpredictable seasonal weather patterns. Zambia's mining sector accounts for 77 percent of the country's overall export value and produces around 28 percent of government revenues, as reported by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Zambia possesses a somewhat limited domestic market that is dispersed geographically throughout the country. Without direct access to the sea, Zambia confronts significant transportation expenses compared to other countries in Southern Africa.

The GRZ (2022) confirms that Zambia's debt burden remains a significant impediment to the overall economy. This has led to increase in interest rates and limited private sector access to credit. The Zambian government and state-owned firms have amassed significant debt to local suppliers, amounting to billions of dollars. This has resulted in extensive job cuts and compelled companies to abandon spending. In December 2021, the Zambian government successfully reached an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Zambia received \$1.4 billion rescue package to address its high energy and agriculture subsidies. The package was part of the G-20 Common Framework to address Zambia's bilateral obligations. The first conference of Zambia's bilateral creditors took place in June 2022, facilitated by the Paris Club. On 25th March 2024, Zambia secured a debt restructuring agreement with Eurobond holders in line with the IMF programme

parameters. Despite these economic challenges, Zambia can still use its unique attributes to pursue foreign policy objectives and engage in diplomatic endeavours within the Southern African region and beyond. Zambia's agility and adaptability can and should help in forming stronger alliances with neighbouring countries and enhance its economic influence.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

It is evident that Zambia has played a significant role in dismantling colonialism and helping other countries in Southern Africa to gain independence. And this came at a great cost to Zambia. As the social constructivist theory suggests, it can be concluded that Zambia's diplomatic engagements in Southern Africa have been largely constructed on the ideological beliefs and values of 'African Humanism', implemented during President Kaunda's administration. Zambia's support to African national movements resulted in the attainment of independence and promotion of harmony in the region. These endeavours contributed to the cooperation of Southern African nations. To date, Zambia's foreign policy and diplomatic contacts in the Southern Region have continued to ride on the liberalist perspective with numerous changes and transformations.

One significant change is the increased focus on economic diplomacy, which involves establishing strong business connections within the region and beyond. Zambia's diplomatic engagement is now grounded on principles and ethics that protect the country's social, economic, political, security, and cultural interests. Its external relations are focused on strengthening cooperation and engagements within the Southern African region with economic diplomacy alongside a foreign policy that prioritises mutual interests, respect, and national interest as the central focus of its agenda. Therefore, with the end of liberation struggles in Southern Africa, Zambia has shifted its focus towards engaging in trade and exploring other potential benefits.

Based on the foregoing experiences, it can be recommended that Zambia should strive to broaden and enhance its resources, encompassing both human capital and financial assets in its foreign service. In the context of economic difficulties that Zambia faces, diplomats must focus on enhancing Zambia's economy, guaranteeing market entry, and fostering corporate growth. Zambia's present focus on economic diplomacy entails utilising foreign policy to enhance domestic economic power and prosperity.

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Contribution of Tourism to Economic Development: Experiences of Selected Individuals in Unguja Island

By

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Abstract

Tourism industry is a platform for either promoting local community development or for bringing changes in moral and ethical values of a community in many islands in the World. This paper analysed the perceptions of local community members on how tourism impacted their economic development. The study used a qualitative approach whereby primary data were collected from participants using interviews and focus group discussions while secondary data were obtained from documentary review of reports, policies, speeches, articles and online sources. The study findings revealed that tourism promoted the economic status of the people of Unguja Island being one among the major sources of foreign revenues to the Government, leading to employment opportunities, infrastructural development and poverty reduction in Zanzibar. The study recommends that the Government of Zanzibar and all stakeholders should take deliberate measures to protect and promote tourism in order to boost the economic development of Zanzibar.

Key words:

Economic development, infrastructure, tourism, Zanzibar

1. Introduction

Tourism industry has become a noteworthy industry in both poor and rich economies because of its important impacts on economic, livelihood and socio-cultural development (Shah, 2000). Tourism is a social, cultural and economic phenomenon which entails the movement of people to countries or places outside their usual environment for personal or business or professional purposes (Malleo and Mtengwa, 2018). Tourism in one way or another is the temporary staying away

from home for a reason of visiting a certain area or place. Visiting can include somebody's travelling to another country other than his or her usual place of residence or within a country of residence for a purpose of recreation, holiday or excursion (UNWTO, 2012). Historically tourism has been practiced by many societies since ancient times. During the 16th Century after the maritime revolution, people from Europe developed the curiosity of traveling along the Atlantic and Indian oceans to discover the "New World" (North and South America). Tourism helps to end poverty as it is related to sustainable development goal number 1 (UN, 2018).

2. Development of Tourism in Zanzibar

Zanzibar is one of the world's most famous tourism destinations. The islands of Zanzibar have been blessed with a natural beauty, a pristine environment, safety and security, friendly and welcoming people, and world class historical sites. Promoting cultural tourism in Zanzibar provides a distinct competitive advantage (Office of Chief Government Statistician of Zanzibar – OCGS, 2025). The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar has planned to improve the social and economic wellbeing of the people of Zanzibar through tourism industry as documented in the blue economy policy of 2020. The initiatives of the Revolutionary Government are enshrined in the strategic government documents like the "*Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Zanzibar - MKUZA II* (2010) which is based on both Zanzibar Development Vision 2050 and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs 1, 8 & 9).

These documents advocate that blue economy should promote inclusive growth and sustainable development of the tourism sector, end poverty everywhere, promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (UN, 2018). As tourism is considered one of the pillars of economic development for Zanzibar, a series of goals and objectives have been devised to optimize the likelihood of achieving this socio-economic target. Such goals and objectives include embracing the Zanzibar's rich natural assets, developing integrated coastal experiences, promoting special interest (niche) markets, targeting the most profitable prospects and applying a collaborative approach to marketing (Commission for Tourism, 2016).

Tourism has been the main factor for economic growth in Zanzibar. Although the current growth is slightly below the 800, 000 target set, it underscores Zanzibar's rising appeal as a leading destination tourist in Africa (Owere, 2025). According to

the Ministry of Finance and Planning Revolutionary (2023), tourism industry in Zanzibar has experienced a steady and rapid growth rate. In fact, tourist arrivals had risen from 394,165 in 2021 to 548,503 in 2022. This is a quick recovery from the impact of COVID 19 pandemic in 2020. As a result, the tourism sector has witnessed an encouraging trend particularly with regard to the mushrooming of first-class hotels and development of infrastructure throughout the islands of Zanzibar. The number of tourist arrivals in Zanzibar has increased reaching 736,755 in 2024 from 638,498 in 2023 (Tanzania Invest, 2024 & Office of Chief Government Statistician, 2025).

In addition, the tourism sector in Zanzibar has been a major catalyst of economic growth and development. The sector has played the most important role in the provision of income, employment, education and training, foreign exchange earnings as well as economic benefits through various industries that are involved in the sector. Other strategic areas benefitting from the growth of the tourism sector include infrastructure, industrial development and human skill development. Likewise, the sector has been one of the fastest growing industries in Zanzibar. Its rapid expansion has been considered as an interesting possibility for poverty reduction (Commission for Tourism, 2016).

Zanzibar has been described as the land of unusual natural species, idealistic Island, land of all kinds of merchants, traders, missionaries and explorers, mother city of East Africa, paradise of Africa, isles of harmony and hospitality and the cradle of standard *Swahili* language. This study explores how the tourism industry has been a major catalyst for economic empowerment to the people of Unguja Island by analyzing their personal experiences relating to tourism impact on their economic empowerment.

3. Methodology

The study is employed a qualitative research design whereby the understanding, perceptions and opinions of participants regarding the tourism sector were taken into consideration as sources of data for the study. The information collected for the study contained primary and secondary data. A case study approach was employed to investigate the significance of the tourism sector in empowering the economy of Zanzibar using a small number of participants (Creswell, 2024). In this study the information was drawn from the people who had sound experience of living as residents of the Unguja Island. This was done for the purposes of gathering real information of what is happening at a particular area of study (Kothari, 2020).

Primary data was obtained from participants mainly through an administration of interviews with ten participants, two focus group discussions with ten participants for each group. The interviews and Focus Group Discussions were conducted at Kiwengwa and Jambiani wards respectively. Furthermore, the researchers conducted a documentary review of government speeches, reports, policies and peer reviewed papers which discuss tourism and poverty alleviations (Dwyer, Gill & Seetaram, 2012). The data collected from the three highlighted data sources were analysed qualitatively using themes and selective coding which included analysing key findings, noting common responses, explaining and interpreting the findings before drawing conclusions.

4. Theoretical Framework

There is a number of studies which have been done concerning the role of tourism in economic development. According to Burhan and Angela (2013), an increasing number of tourist influxes in Tanzania attributes to the socio-economic development and economic empowerment of the people. Burhan and Angela (ibid) believe that the trend of tourists' increase is good for the country's development. The study applied a simple model developed by Malleo and Mtengwa (2018) which advocates that the increase in number of tourists is a stimulus for the economic development through the increase of income and employment among the people. There is evidence of about the influence of tourism industry on the economic empowerment of people in Zanzibar by provision of income and employment. Owere (2025) indicated that 592,613 tourists arrived in Zanzibar by international flights and spent the average of seven nights in 2024. In addition, the tourism sector of Zanzibar has been performing relatively well.

Taking the diversity of the sector and hundreds of people employed by this sector, it is obvious that the issues of foreign exchange and the country's GDP are at the core of this sector. The independent variable in this study will be the contribution of tourist industry while dependent variable will be the economic empowerment to the people of Unguja Island and the intervening variable will be Tourism promotes the increase of private sector investments in things such as hotels, restaurants and transportation facilities. Apart from that, it leads to infrastructural development such as modern airports, roads, water supply networks, and telecommunication infrastructure which led empowerment of the people.

The figure below shows how the Malleo and Mtengwa theory influences economic empowerment of the nation.




Figure 1: Role of Tourism in Development

Source: Malleo and Mtengwa (2018).

5. Findings and Discussion

The contribution of tourism to the development of Unguja Island was vindicated by several respondents who shared their experiences during the interview and FGDs sessions. The question of unemployment for youth has been a major universal problem in the 21st Century. Likewise, the islands of Zanzibar have not escaped from the problem of unemployment especially for the youth. The population of Zanzibar is 1,889,773 out of which 699,845 are youth (United Republic of Tanzania, 2022). Tourism in the Isles, play a major role of job creation, which is an important aspect of economic empowerment. Malleo and Mtengwa (2018) argued that an increase in the number of tourist influx has influence on employment creations in the different sectors, which in turn affects the overall economy. Their argument seems to be reflected in the findings of this study. Their argument gets support from Luvanga and Shitundu (2003) who argued that employment opportunities are higher in tourism than in other sectors.

Tourism economy has contributed to a firm provision of employment opportunities to a great extent in Zanzibar. It is reported that a total of 538, 264 persons in private and public formal employment in Zanzibar are engaged under tourism sector (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2022). However, Shah (2021) pointed out that there are indirect employment opportunities through different activities as observed at Kiwengwa and Jambiani wards in this study. He argued that tourism had indeed created various different job opportunities which enabled the local people to be engaged in transportation, tour guiding, working in different capacities in hotels art and craft activities.

Tourism activities have contributed greatly to the provision of opportunities through natural, cultural and heritage attractions that give opportunities for the

development of small and medium enterprise's (SME) in Zanzibar. A tour guide at Stone Town in Unguja said as quoted below:

Tourism has been the backbone of my economy since it enabled me to build a house and assists me to earn my daily living. I have been doing this job for the past twenty years. It is not easy but I manage to survive”

A small-scale entrepreneur at Nugwi in northern Unguja said that, they sell local made clothing like *Dera*, scarfs and wrappers to tourists. They have partnerships with a number of tour guides who bring tourists to their shops and get commissioned accordingly for any purchase made. This has become a win-win situation for both street vendors and tour guides which helps to reduce poverty in the community to a great extent. Zanzibar poverty fell from 34.9% in 2009 to 30.4% in 2015 and 25.7% in 2019 (World Bank, 2022). The tourism industry provides employment opportunities beyond the hotels and resorts for people of Unguja and Pemba islands.

It is approximated that about 40,000 people are employed in the tourism industry according to Samareskara (2023). This statement was confirmed by the marketing officer of a tourist company in Michamvi who said that they gave the local community support by encouraging tourist activities. As a result, the local people get part time jobs and sell their products to tourists. For instance, while carpenters and craftsmen enjoy by selling their crafts, hotels benefit too by providing meals and accommodation, the government benefits through relevant fees and levies. This helps to boost the national economy and reduce poverty.

Outside the hotels in Unguja Island, small and medium entrepreneurs have managed to utilize the tourism opportunities by opening 69 restaurants of international standards, with several new high-quality establishments opened in Stone Town in the past few years. The number of hotels and guest houses, for example, rose from 620 in 2020 to 709 in 2023 (Malleo & Mtengwa, 2018). Besides that, there is countless number of local catering and entertainment entrepreneurs in the different localities of Unguja suburbs such as Forodhani, Uwanja wa Ndege, Kiembe Samaki, Mkunazini, Malandegwa etc. In addition, there are 108 licensed ground tour operators and diving units. Despite such a large number of licensed operators, only very few of them are big companies. Most of them are SMEs (Commission for Tourism, 2022).

The rise in tourist arrivals in Zanzibar has influenced the rise of income generation

from the public and private sector. Malleo and Mtengwa (2018) pointed out that tourism had been one of the most important aspects for the economy of the islands in Zanzibar, especially with reference to income generation. Tourism provides foreign currency to the Revolution Government of Zanzibar (RGZ) complementing the earning from exports and import duties. In 2019 tourism in Zanzibar accounted for over 80% of foreign exchange earnings. In connection to this, the tourism industry empowered Zanzibar economically through its direct contribution to economic growth in 2019 by 29.2% (Hafidh & Rashid, 2021). This study proves the fact that the tourism sector increases a nation's income and hence promoting her economic growth. For example, 638,498 international tourists entered Zanzibar in the year 2023 compared to 548,503 visitors in 2022 (Xinhua, 2024 & Mikofu, 2025). Tourism is a backbone of Zanzibar's economy recording 29.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2024 (Tanzania Investment and Consultant Group, 2025).

Apart from foreign currency earnings, tourism has contributed to the generation of domestic revenue. In the same year 2024, domestic tourism generated TZS 5.9 billion. The Minister of Finance in 2023 while presenting the Ministry's budget said that, for the year ending 30th June 2023, the estimated annual collections from tourism was around 6.3 billion TZS (Ministry of Finance and Planning 2022). A study by Kweka (2004) suggests that tourism expansion has significant impact on the national economic growth through its contribution to the national GDP. For example, it was estimated that the tourism sector accounted for 27% of the GDP increase in Zanzibar (RGZ, 2017). Therefore, the increase in number of tourists as indicated by the study implies a rise in other sources of income like tax revenue.

The notable goal people need to achieve as the impact of economic empowerment of tourism is infrastructural development. The President of Zanzibar Dr. Hussein Ally Mwinyi who has made significant investment in not only improving the old infrastructure but also constructing new airports and roads in Unguja and Pemba Islands (Maulid, 2023). The study found that investment in infrastructure is an important catalyst for economic empowerment to people simply because it creates employment opportunities and promotes the influx of tourists even to the interior tourist center's where previously it was hard to reach.

Luvanga and Shitundu (2003) pointed out that the influx of the tourists in various parts of Zanzibar has helped to improve both the road infrastructure and social services. A study conducted by Shah (2021) observed that tourism has a great impact on the development of infrastructure such as modern five-star hotels, schools and modern roads. This study's finding indicates that infrastructural

development has been made possible due to the rapid development of the tourism industry in recent years. Efforts to improve roads from town to the airport or from Mjini Magharibi to Makunduchi has make transportation in Zanzibar to be smoother and more enjoyable (Dwivedi and Desai, 2024). Road improvements facilitated not only transportation of tourists but enhanced the economic empowerment for small scale cultivators of fruits and vegetables who enjoy affordable transportation costs.

Poverty reduction has been the main objective of the Revolution Government of Zanzibar since the date of revolution in 1964. Social inclusion and poverty reduction have been a mechanism of soliciting the role of tourism sector as a catalyst for the economic empowerment of the local communities. The fast-rising tourist numbers as indicated by the study has helped to improve the lives of children, families and communities in Unguja. The Tourism Policy of 2017 has direct relation with the Zanzibar Vision 2020 and the third National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP/MKUZA). In the ZSGRP/MKUZA III, tourism is recognized as one among the major pillars of Zanzibar's economic empowerment. Tourism is a sector which develops various employment opportunities to the least developing states like Zanzibar.

The sector is quite significant for the socio-economic development of women, youth, migrant workers and rural populations in the Islands of Unguja and Pemba. According to the report issued by the Bank of Tanzania and National Bureau of Statistics (2023) showed that Zanzibar's expanding tourism industry has played a crucial role in generating a significant economic surplus. Tourism-related activities have helped increase the current account surplus to 506.9 million US dollars up to May 2024 compared to 389.1 million US dollars in the year 2023.

Through the Zanzibar tourism policy, it has been recommended that tourism should support the livelihood of communities through increased incomes and maximizing the contribution of the sector for the nation's economic development. Such efforts have been promoted by encouraging the owners of hotels to purchase vegetables, fruits and fishes from the surrounding communities instead of purchasing from far villages or importing. The strategy has been received wholeheartedly by hotel owners. Shah (2021) pointed out that, at Jambiani and Kiwengwa wards in Unguja there is a noticeable socio-economic contribution of the tourism industry to the local community whereby people are engaged in different activities such as transportation, supply of fishes and fruits, milk and ornaments.

Similarly, the fruits and vegetables farmers at Mwera acknowledge that hotel owner use local suppliers' fruits and vegetables. The preference of purchasing from communities surrounding hotels has developed a close partnership between investors and local communities. This resolution addresses sustainable chain supply management of small farmers in Zanzibar which translates into economic empowerment of the people and definitely leading to poverty reduction (Samareskara, 2023 & World Bank, 2022).

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has shown that tourism has been a major catalyst of economic empowerment to the people of Unguja. The study's objective was to find out how tourism has impacted the community mostly on aspects related to social and economic empowerment. Tourism has been an influencing factor for economic change that is positive within Zanzibar. This is reflected in the claims and justifications given in the responses from the participants which clearly show how tourism has played a significant role in ensuring that economic empowerment, community development and the wellbeing of the people at large have been impacted by tourism activities in Zanzibar.

The recommendations provided herein intend to help government planners and the tourism practitioners on the way forward in helping local communities in terms of implementing good and sound tourism practices. Also, the recommendations are brought forward to help tour operators diversify the nature of their contributions to the local communities. Zanzibar being a rich tourism destination, should be in a good position to address the issue of corporate social responsibility of the tourism stakeholders for the aim of enhancing more local community development socially, economically, culturally and environmentally. It is recommended that the government should emphasize the employment to local people or indigenous people of Zanzibar in the tourism sector for the intention of reducing unemployment and poverty within the communities. This is expected to reduce the Revolutionary Government's burden of ensuring development of the local communities surrounding tourist destinations.

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Journal Policy and Instruction to Authors

Journal Policy

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Schein, E. H. (1980). *Organizational psychology* (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

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